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I. INTRODUCTION
At the end of 1999, one of the largest conglomerates in the world, the
Daewoo Group, collapsed in a spectacular fashion. During its peak,
Daewoo was a sprawling enterprise with over 320,000 employees with 590
subsidiaries overseas that operated in over 110 countries.' Its management
received widespread praise and academic recognition for its success. 2 Yet,
when the Asian financial crisis hit in 1997, it managed to commit a
deception worth 22.9 trillion won ($15.3 billion) that was termed the
"biggest accounting fraud in history, surpassing WorldCom and
* Professor, College of Law, Yonsei University. This article was made possible by
financial support from Yonsei University's Center for Global Studies 2004 Research Fund.
The author would like to thank Heejung Kim, Jeonghoon Seo, Matthew Huh, Suyoune Lee,
Jooyoung Kim, Junhee Kim, Jisoo Lee, B.W. Im, Robin Chung, Joseph Phillips, Hyejin
Kim, Seungho Lee, and, in particular, Mihwa Park for their assistance and comments. An
earlier version of this paper appeared in a monograph titled Anatomy of an Asian
Conglomerate (Hills Governance Center at Yonsei University, Asian Corporate Governance
Case Studies Series, 2005).
1 WON-JONG KOH, NOMURA, THE CHAEBOL RESTRUCTURING RACE BEGINS: ALL EYES ON
THE TOP FOUR 8 (1998); Louis Kraar, Wanted, FORTUNE, Feb. 3, 2003, at 102, 103.
2 See, e.g., Francis J. Aguilar & Dong Sung Cho, Daewoo Group (Harvard Business
School Case Study No. 9-385-014, 1984); John A. Quelch & Chanhi Park, Daewoo's
Globalization: Uz-Daewoo Auto Project (Harvard Business School Case Study No. 9-598-
065, 1998); David Upton & Bowon Kim, Daewoo Shipbuilding and Heavy Machinery
(Harvard Business School Case Study No. 9-695-001, 1994); Videotape: Daewoo Group:
Chairman Kim (Francis J. Aguilar, Harvard Business School Case Study No. 9-885-510,
1985) (on file with author); see also Donald N. Sull et al., Samsung and Daewoo: Two Tales
of One City (Harvard Business School Case Study No. 9-804-055, 2004); Elyssa Tran,
Daewoo and the Korean Chaebol (Centre for Asian Business Cases, University of Hong
Kong, Ref. No. 01/105C, 2001).
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Enron ... ,3 Years later, inner-workings of the conglomerate are finally
coming to light. After hiding as a fugitive overseas for over six years,
Daewoo's chairman, Woo Choong Kim, returned to Korea in June 2005 to
face criminal charges. In 2006, he was sentenced to eight and a half years
in prison and disgorgement of a staggering 17.9 trillion won ($17.9
billion).4 In December 2007, he finally received a presidential pardon.
This juncture serves as an opportune time to assess the ramifications of the
Daewoo debacle.
Around the world, corporate governance has emerged as a focal point
in the reform of companies. In Asia, a consensus exists that the failure of
corporate governance played a pivotal role in precipitating the Asian
financial crisis.6  The crisis spread largely as a result of the inherent
weaknesses of conglomerates and banks; in Korea, for instance, problems
with family-dominated chaebols provoked its collapse.7  The trials and
3 Kraar, supra note 1, at 103; see also South Korea Dumps the Past, at Last, ECONOMIST,
Nov. 11, 2000, at 75 (calling the bankruptcy of Daewoo Motor "the world's largest corporate
failure"); Andrew Ward, Kim Tries to Mend Damaged Reputation, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2003,
at 27 (referring to the fraud as "the world's biggest accounting fraud"). Figures on the exact
amount of accounting fraud have ranged as high as 80 trillion won ($53.3 billion) whereas
the WorldCom's accounting fraud only amounted to $11 billion. Krysten Crawford, Ex-
WorldCom CEO Ebbers Guilty, CNN MONEY, Mar. 15, 2005, http://money.cnn.com/2005/03
/15/news/newsmakers/ebbers/index.htm; Chae-Yong Lee, 'Kim-gi-se-kan' eui se-gye-
gyeong-yeong ['Kim-ghiskhan 's' Global Management], POLINEWS, Apr. 23, 2007, http://
www.polinews.co.kr/news/newsview.html?t =focus&pkey=40300&no=75348. Much debate
exists as to the exact amount of the accounting fraud and how to calculate it. The exchange
rate conversions provided for the reader's convenience apply the following rates for the
Korean won per U.S. dollar: 900 won before 1997, 1,500 won in 1997, 1,400 won in 1998,
1,200 won from 1999 until 2003, and 1,000 won in 2004 and thereafter. Furthermore, all
references to Korea in this Article mean South Korea, unless otherwise noted.
4 Judgment of Nov. 3, 2006, 2006 No 1127 (Seoul High Court), aff'g but modifying,
Judgment of May 30, 2006, 2005 Gohab 588, 794 & 364 (consolidated) (Seoul Dist. Court)
(original sentence before modification by the High Court was 10 years imprisonment and
21.4 trillion won disgorgement). Similarly, in April 2005, the Supreme Court upheld prison
sentences and disgorgement ranging as high 23.07 trillion won ($19.2 billion) against the
most senior Daewoo executives. Judgment of Apr. 29, 2005, 2002 Do 7262 (Supreme
Court). Leading cases will be reviewed in Parts III and IV of this article. Meanwhile,
dozens of civil cases remain pending.
5 S.Korea [sic] Pardons Daewoo Founder, Death-Row Inmates, REUTERS, Dec. 30, 2007,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSSEO20431320071231 ?feed
Type=RSS&feedName=worldNews.
6 See Eric Friedman et al., Corporate Governance and Corporate Debt in Asian Crisis
Countries, in KOREAN CRISIS AND RECOVERY 293 (David T. Coe & Se-Jik Kim eds., 2002);
Simon Johnson et al., Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis, 58 J. FIN. ECON.
141, 184-85 (2000); OECD, WHITE PAPER ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN ASIA 5 (2003)
[hereinafter OECD WHITE PAPER].
7 Keun Lee, Corporate Governance and Growth in the Korean Chaebols: A
Microeconomic Foundation for the 1997 Crisis 17 (Seoul Nat'l Univ. Inst. of Econ. Res.,
Working Paper No. 18, 1999). The term chaebol means a conglomerate or literally a
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tribulations of a major Asian conglomerate such as Daewoo offer an
understanding of the ramifications of poor corporate governance in an
emerging market. The tale of Daewoo further serves as one of the earliest
warning signs of the corporate governance breakdowns that later plagued
the leading companies around the world. It predated the Enron, WorldCom,
Tyco, Vivendi, Ahold and Parmalat scandals that devastated confidence in
global markets.
Daewoo was not a case isolated to Korea. World-renowned
international financial institutions, investment banks, money managers,
financial analysts, accounting firms and credit rating agencies have all
failed to react to the situation. They categorized Daewoo's meltdown as a
remote problem in a faraway region. The wave of policy discussions on the
imperatives of having effective reputational intermediaries and gatekeepers
only came later.8 A case study of Daewoo within the context of
comparative corporate governance also sheds light on the efficacy of formal
law, the importance of enforcement, and the potential for convergence
among governance systems.9 It will show how corporate governance
mechanisms have been activated not only through statutory reforms but also
through alternative ways for establishing legal compliance. Most notably,
Korea has developed a unique means of enforcement outside the traditional
remedies based upon corporate or securities law. Finally, this study shows
how a transplant country from a mixed civil law tradition is converging
toward a more shareholder-oriented corporate governance model from a
state-oriented model.l0
How much of a role corporate governance problems played in the
collapse of Daewoo remains a difficult question. Applying "modern"
concepts of corporate governance might be inappropriate, given Korea's
level of economic development at the time. The term "corporate
"financial clique" or a "money clique" in Chinese characters, and stems from the term
zaibatsu in Japanese. See generally John 0. Haley, Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law:
Competition Policy for East Asia, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 277, 284 n.7 (2004);
Ok-Rial Song, The Legacy of Controlling Minority Structure: A Kaleidoscope of Corporate
Governance Reform in Korean Chaebol, 34 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 183, 245 n. 1 (2002).
8 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301 (2004).
9 See generally Stephen Choi, Law, Finance and Path Dependence: Developing Strong
Securities Markets, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1657, 1702 (2002) (providing a general discussion on
convergence, path dependence theory, and comparative corporate governance).
10 For general discussions on different models of corporate governance and theories on
convergence, see John C. Coffee, The Future As History: The Prospects for Global
Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 641, 679-82
(1999) (discussing the functional convergence and formal convergence); Ronald J. Gilson,
Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L.
329 (2001); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law,
89 GEO. L.J. 439, 446-47, 451 (2001).
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governance," for example, did not even exist in the Korean business
vernacular.1 Some insist that Daewoo was a victim of external shocks or a
scapegoat of political intrigue. 12 They cite how Daewoo affiliates have
rebounded to profitability after the crisis.' 3 With the benefit of hindsight,
they argue, forensic studies can exaggerate faults and causes that might
appear self-explanatory. These challenges will be addressed below.
This Article begins with a comprehensive review of the history of
Daewoo, particularly relative to other chaebol conglomerates. In Part III,
the Article provides a survey of the internal corporate governance structure
of Daewoo, particularly by examining the roles of its board of directors,
officers, shareholders, and banks. Part IV then describes the external
corporate governance landscape of Korea, with special focus on the failure
of reputational intermediaries, gatekeepers, and public institutions. This
Article argues that while primary responsibility for the collapse lies with
Daewoo's own problems and Korea's underdeveloped corporate
governance framework, other market players-especially the leading
international institutions-cannot escape the responsibility. In Part V, the
Article concludes that corporate governance policy in emerging markets
must be reformulated to reach a more balanced and comprehensive
perspective.
II. THE CHAEBOL AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
This Part provides the background of Daewoo from its beginning to its
demise in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. It explains how
Daewoo became a leading conglomerate under Korea's state-oriented
11 Variations of the "corporate governance" concept first appeared in 1981 and were
explored after 1993 by numerous scholars. See, e.g., Deuk-Joon Yu, Gi-eop-uija-bon-so-yu-
gu-jo-wa ji-bae-gu-jo-e gwan-han yeon-gu [A Study on Capital and Governance Structures
of Publicly-Held Corporations], in KOREA SECURITIES ACADEMY, SYMPOSIUM 1 (1981);
Young-Jo Kim, So-yu-wa gyeong-yeong-ui bun-ri-e dae-han bi-pan-jeok non-ui [A Critical
View of the Separation of Ownership and Management], 29 INDUSTRY & MGMT. 225-61
(1992). A more unified definition only emerged circa 1993. See, e.g., KWANG-SUN CHUNG,
KOREA INST. OF FIN., CORPORATE COMPETITIVENESS AND GOVERNANCE (1994); WOONG-GI
IM ET AL., INSTITUTE OF EAST & WEST STUDIES OF YONSEI UNIV., GONG-GI-EOP-UI MIN-
YEONG-HWA-WA GI-EOP-GU-JO-E GWAN-HAN YEON-GU [PRIVATIZATION AND CORPORATE
STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN KOREA] 7-9 (1993); KOREA SEC. SUPERVISORY SERV.,
SECURITIES & ECONOMIC INFORMATION (Sept.-Oct. 1993).
12 HAN-GUK-GYEONG-JE-SIN-MUN SPECIAL COVERAGE TEAM, DAEWOO JA-SAL-IN-GA TA-
SAL-IN-GA [WAS DAEWOO A SUICIDE OR A MURDER] 16 (2002) [hereinafter DAEWOO
SUICIDE].
3 Id. at 273-86. Yet, this only proves the importance of corporate governance because
these companies only became viable after they became independent from the conglomerate.
Jong-Sei Park & Young-Jin Kim, Geu-rup-hae-che 5 nyeon ... Daewoo-ga sal-a-it-da [Five




corporate governance system. Woo Choong Kim's role as the founder,
chairman and controlling shareholder of the Daewoo Group is then profiled.
This Part also describes the characteristics of chaebols, family-controlled
conglomerates that dominated the Korean economy.
A. The Making of the "Great Universe"
In 1967, 30-year-old Woo Choong Kim founded Daewoo Industrial, a
textile exporter, with just five employees and $18,000.14 The two Chinese
characters that form the name Daewoo meant "Great Universe," true to the
ambitions of the young entrepreneur. From its humble beginnings, business
expanded rapidly, and by 1972, it became the second largest exporter in
Korea. 15 Daewoo played a major role in Korea's economic success when
the country achieved the "Miracle of the Han River" and transformed itself
from an underdeveloped backwater into a developed nation in the span of
forty years. 16 Under Kim's guidance, by 1996, Daewoo became the world's
largest transnational entity among emerging economies, surpassing such
companies as Xerox, Amoco, Volvo, Fujitsu, and Glaxo Wellcome.
17
Daewoo excelled at acquiring distressed companies, mostly from the
government and then turning them around. In 1976, for instance, Daewoo
assumed control over Hankook Machinery Ltd., a manufacturer of
industrial machinery, rolling stock, and diesel engines that had not shown a
profit for thirty-eight years. Senior executives had opposed the acquisition,
but Woo Choong Kim prevailed over them. 18 After changing its name to
Daewoo Heavy Industries, the company started generating profits in its
second year. 19 In another fabled example, in 1978 Daewoo acquired Okpo
Shipbuilding Company, a company teetering on bankruptcy.20 Merged into
14 Aguilar & Cho, supra note 2, at 2.
15 Sang-Hun Choe, Daewoo Founder Returns Home to Protesters and Arrest, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., June 15, 2005, at 3.
16 Sung-Won Park, 'Se-gye-gyeong-yeong'jo-ta-su Jang Byung-ju jun 6u) Daewoo sa-
jang, cheo-eum-eu-ro ip-yul-da [Global Management's Steersman, the Former Daewoo
Corp. 's President Byung-Ju Jang Speaks for the First Time], NEW DONG-A, Aug. 2005, at
104-15.
17 UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1997: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS,
MARKET STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION POLICY, at xvii, 29-31 tbl.1.7 (1997), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir1997 en.pdf (calculated based upon foreign assets in
1995).
18 Aguilar & Cho, supra note 2, at 3-4.
91d. at4.
20 Sang-Dae Kim, Gou-daejo-sun-up-chaefi-bang-ip-ji-gaji-yok-no-dong-gye-e mi-chin
young-hang [Effects of Big Marine Corporations in Regional Areas on Regional Labor
System], 17 Soc. SCI. RESEARCH 235, 235-36 (1999). Daewoo received a host of incentives
from the government for taking over Okpo. Dong Gull Lee, The Restructuring of Daewoo,
in ECONOMIC CRISIS AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING IN KOREA 150, 153 (Stephen Haggard
et al. eds., 2003).
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Daewoo Heavy Industries, Kim guided the shipyard to positive returns by
1983.21 Daewoo's mode of acquisition, turn-around, and expansion became
a trademark of the conglomerate-major businesses of Daewoo were not
2established by Daewoo, but obtained through mergers or acquisitions.
Another cornerstone of Daewoo's business strategy was its orientation
towards exports. Unlike other chaebols, Daewoo championed an
international focus from its beginning.23 The group prided itself on its
ability to spearhead the opening of new markets overseas. By 1979, it
became the largest exporter in Korea, following the government's economic
development plans of export-led growth.24 Daewoo launched a Global
Management Strategy in 1993 to further expand its operations across the
world. By 1998, it had established 590 subsidiaries overseas.26  Over
320,000 employees worked worldwide in 110 countries, from South
America to Africa and Eastern Europe.27 Despite the national security
risks, Daewoo was even among the first to try to develop businesses with
North Korea. 8
Critics claimed that Daewoo succeeded because of its ability to extract
support from the government through rent-seeking while leveraging that it
had become too important to be allowed to falter.2 In 1988, for example, it
21 Hyeong-Rae Cho, Heavy Industry Firms Turn Hi-tech, DIGITAL CHOSUN ILBO
(ENGLISH EDITION), May 5, 2003, http://english.chosun.com/w2ldata/html/news/200305
/200305050003.html.
22 Aguilar & Cho, supra note 2, at 10 ("Every major new business entry for Daewoo had
involved the takeover of an existing troubled company.").
23 Kyong-Hoon Min, Daewoo heung-mang-ui kyo-hun [A Lesson from the Rise and Fall
of Daewoo], KOREA TIMES (AMERICA), June 14, 2005. http://www.koreatimes.com/article
/articleview.asp?id=250894&commentyn=N (last visited Feb. 16, 2008).
24 KOREA DEV. INST., HAN-GUK-GYEONG-JE BAN-SE-GI: YEOK-SA-JEOK-PYEONG-GA-WA 21
SE-GI BI-JEON [KOREAN ECONOMY OF HALF A CENTURY: HISTORIC EVALUATION AND THE
TWENTY FIRST CENTURY VISION] 39 (Dong-Se Cha & Kwang-Seok Kim eds., 1995).
25 II-Hoon Cho, Mi-wan-u-ro-keut-nan Se-gye-kyung-young: 9-gae yet gae-yul-sa si-
chong 2 5-jo... 8-nyun-sae 12-bae 'kung-choong' [Incomplete Global Strategy: 9 Affiliated
Companies 25 Trillion Won. . . 'Jumped' 12 Times in 8 Years], HANKYGNG, Mar. 22, 2007,
available at http://www.hankyung.com/news/app/newsview.php?aid=200703214038 1&
intype=l. See generally Dong-Jae Kim, Geul-ro-beol-deu-rim-eul sil-hyeon-ha-neun sin-
gyeong-yeong-jeon-nyak [New Business Management Strategy to Fulfill a Global Dream], in
SE-GYE-GA YEOL-RIN-DA MI-RAE-GA BO-IN-DA [THE WORLD IS OPENING AND You CAN SEE
THE FUTURE] (Jae-Myeong Seo ed., 1998).
26 KOH, supra note 1, at 8 (concluding that "the risk involved [in these type of expansion
plans] should not be understated").
27 Kraar, supra note 1, at 103; Tran, supra note 2, at 11.
28 Kim became the first business leader to visit North Korea and Daewoo became the first
Korean business entity to invest there. Mark Clifford, The Daewoo Comrade: South Korean
Firm Blazes Northern Trail, FAR E. ECON. REV., Feb. 20, 1992, at 47.
29 CHAN-HYUK SOHN, KOREA INST. FOR INT'L ECON. POLICY, KOREA'S CORPORATE
RESTRUCTURING SINCE THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 28 (2002), available at http://www.kiep.go
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faced disaster when Daewoo Shipbuilding and Heavy Machinery verged on
collapse due to a crushing debt of 1.2 trillion won ($1.8 billion) that
resulted from deteriorating market conditions. 30  Amid criticism that the
company should have undergone insolvency proceedings according to
market principles, the government bailed it out with a 400 billion won
($600 million) restructuring package in 1989.31 The generous rescue
package reasserted Daewoo's lobbying ability while confirming the
government's inability to take decisive actions. This fueled the myth that
Daewoo and other chaebols had become too big to fail. Chaebols engaged
in increasingly riskier behavior in the belief that they could rely upon
government intervention when in jeopardy.
32
In 1978, Daewoo embarked on its tragic foray into the automobile
industry through a 50% acquisition of Saehan Motor in a joint venture with
GM Korea.33 What later became Daewoo Motor met the strategy of both
turning around distressed companies and expanding through exports. The
company sought growth and market share instead of focusing on
profitability and research and development. After first buying out GM's
remaining 50% stake in 1992, a series of entries into foreign automobile
markets followed.3 4 In 1994, Daewoo Motor acquired the Worthing
Technical Centre in the United Kingdom and entered into an automobile
joint venture with Rodae in Romania.35 In 1996, it entered the Polish
automobile market with the $1.1 billion acquisition of Fabryka
Samochodow Osobowych ("FSO").3 6 In addition, the company bought a
southern Poland truck factory for $700 million, Czech Republic's Avia
.kr/common/board file down.asp? 13168911.
30 Hye-Won Lee, Daewoo, DEW, Sept. 1, 1999, http://www.ewhadew.com/news/read
.php?idxno=353.
31 Mark Clifford, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do, FAR E. ECON. REv., May 11, 1989, at 63;
Seoul WillAid Shipbuilders, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1989, at D18.
32 Clifford, supra note 31, at 63.
33 John Ravenhill, From National Champions to Global Partnerships: The Korean Auto
Industry, Financial Crisis and Globalization 6 (MIT Japan Program, Working Paper No.
01.04, 2001), available at http://mit.edu/mit-japan/outreach/working-papers/WPO 1 04.pdf
34 Don Kirk, GM Confirms Daewoo Talks but Won't Discuss Buying In, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Feb. 3, 1998, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/1998/02/03/daewoo.t.php.
Daewoo was not the only example of a Korean company making a foray into the automobile
industry that later proved devastating. Shinhan Motor, Kia Motor, Ssangyong Motor, and
even Samsung Motors are all examples of critical failures in Korean corporate history.
Ravenhill, supra note 33, at 4. Ford later suggested that they dropped their bid for Daewoo
Motor not because of huge debts but because of the poor business prospects of turning it
around. South Korea Dumps the Past, at Last, supra note 3.
35 Yong Suhk Pak et al., Lessons Learned from Daewoo Motors' Experience in Emerging
Markets, 10.2 MULTINATIONAL Bus. REv. 122, 123 (2002).
36 Jane Perlez, European Beachhead for Korean Ambition, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1996, at
DI ("How Daewoo, a debt-laden company, plans to finance the rapid expansion is not
exactly clear.").
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truck manufacturer for $200 million, Uzbekistan's Uz car plant, and teamed
up with other carmakers from Ukraine and India.37 The acquisition spree
led to fourteen new vehicle plants in thirteen countries, which culminated
with the purchase of a 51.98% stake in Ssangyong Motor in January 1998 at
the height of the financial crisis.3 8 This kind of reckless expansion into the
automobile business overwhelmed the conglomerate.
39
Meanwhile, Daewoo's financial structure relied upon debt. While
debt-to-equity ratios for chaebols typically exceeded 400%, Daewoo
surpassed everyone in its over-reliance on debt. 40 As early as 1988, with
over $11.2 billion in borrowings, Daewoo stood as Korea's most indebted
conglomerate.4' Its debt gearing in 1998 was allegedly as high as 2,000%
or greater.42 In fact, for foreign investment projects, Daewoo followed a
"one-hundredth strategy., 43 It boasted that Daewoo only required 1% of the
total capital needed for a project because they could finance the rest through
preferential loans from foreign countries' banks, inter-subsidiary debt
payment guarantees, joint investment from local investors, and other
sources.
4 4
Another notable feature was that the de facto holding company, the
Daewoo Corp., was not the profit center of the conglomerate.45 Daewoo
Corp. primarily acted as a trading and financial company for products and
services. In difficult times, therefore, it did not have the capacity to provide
financial support to weaker affiliates. Instead, it later served as the group's
nerve center that directed the use of offshore entities as conduits for the
accounting frauds. 46
37 Jang-Yeol Chung, Se-gye-gyeong-yeong-ui dae-do-bak [The Global Business
Strategy's Gamble], WEEKLY CHOSUN, Dec. 5, 1996, at 46-47; Peter S. Green, For Daewoo
Group, Eastern Europe Remains Mostly in the Red, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1999, at C7.
38 Dong-Han Lee, Daewoo-geu-rup-ui hae-che jung-san-seo [An Accounting of the
Dismantlement of the Daewoo Group], MONTHLY CHoSuN, Dec. 1999, at 672, available at
http://monthly.chosun.com/board/view-tum.asp?tnu= 199912100064&catecode=G&cpage= 1
see infra Part II.D.
39 Daewoo had also attempted to enter the oil refinery business by acquiring Hanwha
Energy and almost acquired France's Thompson Media in return for assuming its crushing
debt of 4.8 billion Francs. Daewoo, E-Ansaldo-in-su Han-wha-E I-ran-gwa gong-dong-in-
su [Daewoo, Acquiring Ansaldo (Italy) and Co-aquiring Hanwha Energy with Iran],
MUNHWA ILBO, May 27, 1998, available at http://www.munhwa.com/news/view.html?no
=19980527679.
40 Business: The Company File New Action Plan for Korea's Big Five, BBC NEWS, Aug.
25, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/430068.stm.
41 Mark Clifford, Under-Powered Performer, FAR E. ECON. REV., Dec. 8, 1988, at 52.
42 Lee, supra note 20, at 159.
41 Id. at 153.
44 Id. at 153-54.
41 Id. at 155-56.
46 Park, supra note 16, at 104-15.
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Unsurprisingly, Daewoo received the lowest market valuations and
had to pay the highest interest rates among the chaebols. Capital markets
have long discounted Daewoo companies. As of April 1997, for example,
Daewoo had a 1.1 price-to-book ratio, the lowest among leading
conglomerates which averaged more than iwo.47 Daewoo's actual interest
rates were 2.6% higher than the average among the top-five chaebols in
1997.48 The spread between Daewoo bonds and other chaebols was already
1% in 1998, but increased to 2 to 3% by early 1999.49 The discounts and
spreads reflected the market's uncertainty over Daewoo's earnings
prospects relative to its risks. Of course, even these discounts were far too
generous, considering what was concealed through the accounting and loan
frauds. Nevertheless, the valuations reflect the degree of knowledge that
market participants-particularly the sophisticated domestic and foreign
ones-held of the risk in dealing with the conglomerate.
Notwithstanding, the sustainability of the Daewoo brand name is
evident in the fact that its brand image and brand recognition still remain
strong in the international marketplace.50  After the conglomerate's
collapse, nearly a dozen companies continue to operate under the Daewoo
brand name.5 1 Leading Daewoo companies even retain the same senior
52management . Yet, the success of the companies in many ways
demonstrates the importance of corporate governance; they have only
managed to become competitive enterprises after they unshackled
themselves from the collective burdens of the conglomerate. 3  As
independent companies, they can now operate for their own benefit without
regard for the welfare of other affiliates.
47 Lee, supra note 20, at 157.
48 WONJONG KOH, NOMURA, ALARM BELLS RINGING FOR THE DAEWOO GROUP 3 (1998).
4' DAEWOO SUICIDE, supra note 12, at 72. Its commercial paper rates were also three to
5% higher than other chaebols by late 1998. FIN. SUPERVISORY COMM'N & FIN.
SUPERVISORY SERV., DAEWOO-GEU-RUP WEO-KEU-A-UT CHU-JIN-HYEON-HWANG MIT HYANG-
HU-GYE-HWEK [DAEWOO GROUP WORKOUT CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE PLANS] 2 (1999)
[hereinafter 1999 GOVERNMENT REPORT].
50 According to the consultancy, Interbrand, in its 2004 Readers' Choice Awards,
Daewoo still ranked 69th in the world for the brand with the most global impact. Global
Rankings, http://www.brandchannel.com/boty_results/global-list.asp (last visited Mar. 8,
2008).
51 Jong-Ho Kim, Daewoo-neun sal-a-it-da! [Daewoo Still Lives!], MONTHLY CHOSUN,
Jan. 2004.
52 DAEWOO SUICIDE, supra note 12, at 207. Loyalists still wait for the comeback of their
charismatic leader Woo Choong Kim. See, for example, Daewoo Love, http://www
.daewoolove.com (last visited Mar. 8, 2008), for a website operated by loyal Daewoo
supporters.
53 Park & Kim, supra note 13, at 1, 3. One of Daewoo's crown jewels, Daewoo Heavy
Industries and Machinery has finally been put up for sale by Korea Asset Management
Corporation ("KAMCO") and Korea Development Bank. Francesco Guerrera & Anna
Fifield, Doosan 'to Win Daewoo', FIN. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2004, at 26.
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B. Tragic Hero: Chairman Woo Choong Kim
Daewoo cannot be discussed separately from its legendary founder,
Woo Choong Kim. He not only established the company, but determined
its course, dominated its decision-making process, and handpicked its
executives. 4  In terms of business strategy, he maintained the same
management perspective until the end: seize market share first, quash
competition, and seek collection later.55 Toward this end, he maximized his
expertise in corporate turn-around and rent-seeking. His global perspective
on the need for Korean companies to develop overseas markets was
visionary, particularly given the reclusive tendencies of Korean executives
at the time. He traveled around the world over 260 days out of the year
seeking business opportunities. 56 His indomitable spirit, tireless energy,
and grand dreams for Korea attracted a legion of professionals. In the end,
he deserves the most credit for the conglomerate's success but remains
primarily responsible for its meltdown.
Kim built the Great Universe of Daewoo into a multinational
conglomerate in less than two decades. Recognized as one of the world's
most successful businessmen, he was profiled in leading business
magazines everywhere. 7 In 1984, he received the International Chamber of
Commerce's coveted International Business Award that was conferred by
Sweden's King Carl GustafXVI 5 8 He wrote a bestselling autobiographical
book, "Every Street is Paved with Gold," that sold over two million
copies.59 Published in twenty-one languages, it propounded his corporate
philosophy on the need to expand internationally. 0 In September 1998, he
became the captain of Korean industry when he was elected chairman of the
Federation of Korean Industries ("FKI"), an influential organization of
54 BYONG-KUK KIM, KIM Woo-CHuNG: SCHUMPETERIAN ENTREPRENEUR 20 (1988).
55 According to one anecdote, Kim sold newspapers when he was young. Competition
for newspaper delivery was fierce in war-tom Korea although he was one of the fastest
delivery people in the neighborhood. He then devised a strategy that solidified his position
as the most profitable delivery person in the region. He discovered that he lost significant
time against his competitors in the payment collection process, so he decided to deliver as
many newspapers as he could first and then collect payments afterwards. He calculated that
he would be far more profitable even if he did not receive payments for some newspapers
delivered. He soundly beat out his competitors. Id. at 32.
56 Laxmi Nakarmi, Globalization: Good Intentions, ASIAWEEK, Feb. 18, 2000; Jae-Hoon
Shim, Head of the Universe, FAR E. ECON. REV., May 1, 1997, at 46.
57 DONG-SUNG CHO, KIM Woo CHOONG 87-88 (2005).
58 KIM, supra note 54, at 118.
59 The Korean version of this book was first published in 1989 under the title "Se-gye-
neun nulp-go hal-il-uen man-ta [It's a Big World and There's Lots to Be Done]." The
English translation followed in 1994: Woo CHOONG KiM, EVERY STREET IS PAVED WITH
GOLD (1994). Kraar, supra note 1, at 103.





Politically, Daewoo benefited from Kim's instincts and apparently his
personal relationship with President Chung Hee Park, the controversial
autocrat who ruled South Korea from 1961 until 1979.62 Although a
latecomer compared to other established conglomerates, Daewoo
blossomed under Park's industrial policy during the 1960s and 1970s. Kim
managed to extract concessions from the government, especially when
taking over distressed companies. While the government would engage in
predation of its own, time and time again it would succumb to Kim's
requests for support. Even after Park died, Daewoo continued to rely on
Kim's political acumen to steer them out of difficulties.
During the financial crisis, however, Kim's political wherewithal and
managerial judgment faltered, leading Daewoo to catastrophe. By the
summer of 1999, he departed the country in a self-imposed exile. 63 He
returned after six years of hiding on his own volition to receive an eight-
year prison sentence in 2006, with numerous civil trials still pending.64 In
his own words, he claimed that "[m]y big mistake was being too ambitious,
especially in autos .... I tried to do too much too fast.,
65
Fundamentally, Kim failed to follow the basic legal and managerial
principles such as accounting, internal controls, and financial discipline,
while placing too much emphasis upon marketing and generating sales.
Standards of good corporate governance were unobserved. He did not heed
warnings to retract, and instead chose to expand through an unprecedented
accounting and loan fraud.66 In the end, the ultimate responsibility for the
Daewoo catastrophe lies with him.
C. Chaebol Business Practice and Culture
The chaebols that dominated the South Korean economy shared many
common features. Nurtured under the government's industrial-growth
policy, they followed the same financing methods, business models,
ownership structures, and operating practices. A state-oriented corporate
61 About FKI: The Past Chairmen, http://www.fki.or.kr/en/About/Chairmanl.aspx (last
visited Jan. 8, 2008).
62 Park reportedly favored Kim because Kim's father was a former high school teacher of
his whom he had respected. Don Kirk, For Daewoo's Founder, Pride Before the Fall, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 23, 2001, at W1.
63 His Korean passport expired in 2002 and according to the Korean National Policy
Agency, he acquired French citizenship in 1987. Yeong-Eun Jang, Kim-woo-choong-ssi 87-
nyeon peu-rang-seu guk-jeok-chwi-deuk [Woo Choong Kim Acquires French Citizenship in
1987], YONHAP NEWS, Dec. 27, 2002. The District Court decision that sentenced him to ten
years imprisonment confirmed that he was a French citizen. 2005 Gohab 588, at 2.
64 S.Korea [sic] Pardons Daewoo Founder, supra note 5.
65 Kraar, supra note 1, at 103.
66 Id.
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governance modus operandi prevailed, as the country unified behind the
chaebols according to the dictates of policymakers. Interested parties
such as shareholders, employees, consumers, and managers received
secondary priority given the nation's collective focus on economic
development and employment during the 1960s and 1970s.
First and foremost, chaebols maintained a patriarchic management
style that revolved around the controlling shareholder's domination.
Excessive concentration of power became the source of most of their
corporate governance problems. Chairmen, serving as both the controlling
shareholder and the founder, reigned as moguls over empires of companies.
The participation of directors, statutory auditors, external auditors, and non-
controlling shareholders in the governance process was subsumed under the
command of chairmen. Defiant managers that dared to challenge imperial
orders faced swift retribution, leaving controlling shareholders with
uncontested authority. The state of predominance was compounded
particularly at the senior level, because executives lacked alternative
employment options due to Korea's poor labor market flexibility.68
Under a state-oriented corporate governance system, the government
operated in an intertwined, symbiotic relationship with the chaebols.
Chaebols operated according to government policies, because following
these policies allowed them to receive "preferential policy loans, tax
credits, subsidies, protection and even bailouts when [they] got into
financial trouble."6  The Korean government provided management-
friendly labor laws, condoned monopolies and oligopolies, gave out special
licenses and permits, and set up trade and investment barriers to foreign
competition. Chaebols received favorable treatment as long as they
performed reasonably well. From one perspective, Korea's economic
success evinces the merits of such industrial policies based upon close
industrial and government cooperation. At its worst, however, such
collusion led to illegal rent-seeking and predation. In the most egregious
example, a dozen leading chaebol chairmen, 70 including Woo Choong Kim,
contributed over 510 billion won ($638 million) in bribes during the 1980s
and early 1990s to two Korean presidents during that period. 71  These
chairmen claimed they could not defy the presidents' solicitations for slush
67 For a general description of a state-oriented model of corporate governance, see
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 10, at 446-47.
68 Joongi Kim, Recent Amendments to the Korean Commercial Code and Their Effects on
International Competitions, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 273, 330 (2000).
69 Lee, supra note 20, at 152-53.
70 At that time, the heads of all major chaebols were men.
71 Joongi Kim & Jong Bum Kim, Cultural Differences in the Crusade Against
International Bribery: Rice-Cake Expenses in Korea and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
6 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 549, 568 (1997); see infra Section IV.D.
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funds, yet the chaebols derived significant benefits in return.72
Policymakers also protected the control of chaebol families. Initially, like
other Asian companies, families held a large, concentrated ownership in
their companies. In the 1970s, however, the government browbeat
chaebols into listing their major companies on the stock exchange.74
Listing by chaebols served two governmental purposes. First, compelling
chaebol families to disperse their ownership to the public would lead to
sharing of the benefits that chaebols received from the special preferences.75
Second, rights offering served to provide much-needed liquidity to the
fledgling stock market. Families initially resisted listing their companies
out of concerns that dispersion of their ownership could threaten their
control. With generous indirect financing available from banks, the
companies also had little need for equity financing.7 6 To convince them,
the government decided to protect chaebols from the threats to ownership
control by curbing shareholder and stakeholder rights for acquiring control
and challenging board decisions.77
Ownership dispersion coupled with weaker, rather than stronger,
minority shareholders protections sowed the seeds for corporate governance
problems. With control rights protected, entrenched families gradually
allowed dilution of their cash flow rights with each rights offering. Over
time, families held only marginal ownership.78 Meanwhile they were
allowed to secure control through a vast web of crisscrossing share
ownership between affiliates. 79 As the discrepancy between cash-flow
rights and control rights became wider, the controlling shareholder's
72 Yeong-Ho Yun, Gam-hi-na-neul-jo-sa-hae? Dae-sun-ja-keum-hwak-bun-da [You Dare
Investigate me? I Will Reveal Everything About the Presidential Election Slush Funds],
WEEKLY DONG-A, Jan. 3, 2002.
73 SOHN, supra note 29, at 68.
74 Company Listing Promotion Act, Law No. 2420 of 1972 (repealed by Law No. 3946
of 1987) (S. Korea).
75 Employees were to benefit as well through the preemptive rights they could acquire
through Employee Stock Ownership Plans. See generally The National Center for Employee
Ownership, How an Employee Stock Ownership (ESOP) Works, http://www.nceo.org
/library/esops.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2008).
76 SOHN, supra note 29, at 26.
77 Jaymin Lee, Economic Crisis and Structural Reform in Korea, in STRUCTURAL
REFORMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: EXPERIENCES OF THE NORTHEAST ASIA 42-43
(Chan-Hyun Sohn ed., 2003).
78 Jinbang Kim, Han-guk Chaebol-ui so-yu-wa ji-bae: 199 7-2002 [The Ownership and
Governance of Korean Chaebols:1997-2002], 9 GYEONG-JE-BAL-JEON-YEON-GU [EcoN.
DEV. RES.] 97 (2003).
79 Many Asian companies have similar ownership structures. OECD WHITE PAPER,
supra note 6, at 11; SEON-GU KIM ET AL., SEOUL NAT'L UNIV. INST. OF ECON. RES., CHUL-JA-
CHONG-AEK-JE-HAN-JE-DO-U BA-RAM-JIK-HAN GAE-SEON-BANG-HYANG [APPROPRIATE WAY
TO IMPROVE THE TOTAL INVESTMENT LIMITATION SYSTEM] 113-14 tbl.3.1 (2003).
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interests diverged even further from the other shareholders, and the inherent
agency problems became greater. The anomalous situation of control
without corresponding ownership and dispersed ownership without strong
shareholder protections emerged as a fundamental issue. Chaebols became
vulnerable to empire-building and more serious ills such as
misappropriation.
During the period Korea was rapidly developing, chaebols routinely
engaged in related-party transactions among affiliates. In fact, intra-
conglomerate assistance among affiliates without regard to corporate
governance of individual companies was a common practice. 80 Not only
was such practice not punished, governmental administrative guidance
often required affiliate support for risky but strategically important
companies as a condition for receiving bank loans. 81 Stronger companies
helped start-ups and rescued troubled affiliates through equity infusions,
debt guarantees, and transfer pricing, on non-market terms, according to the
mandates of governmental policy.82 In the worst cases, controlling families
or senior managers of the company used related-party deals to engage in
self-dealing and to extract other private benefits of control.83
Chaebols adhered to the "too-big-to-fail (dae-ma-bul-sa)" doctrine.84
Through their network of companies, they accounted for a predominant
share of the country's employment, production, income, and exports. Their
impact on the economy was multiplied considering downstream and
upstream industries, suppliers, outsourcers, transporters, retailers, and
distributors. Conventional belief under the doctrine held that bureaucrats
did not have the nerve to endure the political costs and social dislocation
generated by permitting the collapse of a chaebol, particularly one of the
80 Lee, supra note 77, at 42.
8 1 The Korean Fair Trade Commission ("KFTC") only launched its first regulatory
enforcement actions to stem chaebols from engaging in abusive subsidization in 1998.
KOREAN FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, BU-DANG-HAN JI-WON-HAENG-WI-UI SIM-SA-JI-CHIM (NAE-
BU-JI-CHIM) [IMPROPER SUPPORTING ACTS EVALUATION GUIDE (INTERNAL GUIDE)] (1997) (S.
Korea).
82 SEA-JIN CHANG, FINANCIAL CRISIS AND TRANSFORMATION OF KOREAN BUSINESS
GROUPS: THE RISE AND FALL OF CHAEBOLS 76 (2003).
83 Bernard S. Black et al., Corporate Governance in Korea at the Millennium: Enhancing
International Competitiveness, 26 J. CORP. L. 546, 596 (2001).
84 Lee, supra note 20, at 150; Edward Graham, Breaking South Korea's 'Too Big to Fail'
Doctrine, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2005, at All; Yong-Sam Kim & Seung-Ho Song,
Daewoo-geu-rup-ui ma-ji-mak gu-jo-jo-jeong-bon-bu-jang Kim-woo-il-ui yang-sim-seon-
eon [The Conscience Declaration of Woo-Il Kim, Daewoo Group 's Last Restructuring
Executive], MONTHLY CHOSUN, Nov. 2001, at 663, available at http://monthly.chosun.com
/board/viewcontent.asp?tnu=200112100036&catecode=C&cpage = l. The expression dae-
ma-bul-sa derives from the game of baduk, or go in Japanese, and literally means "large
horses do not die."
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largest ones. Market participants therefore clung to this myth. 5
Sophisticated investors, creditors, and reputational intermediaries, domestic
and foreign alike, downplayed the importance of good corporate
governance, because they believed chaebols had a sovereign guarantee from
"Korea, Inc." Meanwhile, these beliefs nurtured a moral hazard that led
chaebols to increase their sizes and assume undue risks because they
believed that they could rely upon the government's safety net.
Furthermore, chaebol companies and chairmen linked fates of parent
and affiliate companies through debt or payment guarantees.8 6 Guarantees
were demanded as a condition for obtaining bank loans or making bond
offerings, although the collective risk was not properly gauged. The
collapse of one affiliate could endanger others that had guaranteed its loan
payment and start a chain reaction that could threaten a string of companies,
if not the entire conglomerate. By the conjoined fates of companies, these
guarantees exacerbated the problems associated with the too-big-to-fail
doctrine. Banks also routinely demanded that chaebol heads personally
guarantee company debts as an additional form of security, even though the
size of these personal guarantees was already beyond their capacity.
87
When difficulties arose, nothing held the chairmen back from assuming
excessive risks, because they could no longer limit their exposure to a
manageable level.
From an industrial organization perspective, many conglomerates
followed a horizontal package approach-they provided a diversified range
of goods and services for a single large project. Under this approach, the
entire operations of a chaebol could be enlisted, for example, from
construction to trading, sales, marketing, and financing. When a
construction company builds a hotel, other affiliate companies would obtain
the financing, provide automobiles and buses, train the staff, and promote
the property. This organizational structure served as a justification to
85 One example of the special status for larger conglomerates occurred in April 1998
during the financial crisis. The Financial Supervisory Commission ("FSC") announced that
the top five chaebols could largely restructure on their own while smaller chaebols would be
placed in stricter workout programs, underlining the impression that larger chaebols received
a differentiated treatment. See Lee, supra note 20, at 171.
86 See, e.g., Nissho Iwai Eur. PLC v. Korea First Bank, 782 N.E.2d 55, 57 (N.Y. 2002)
(describing a Daewoo Corp.'s guarantee of a $150 million loan from Nissho to Daewoo
Hong Kong, Ltd.).
87 Jong-Sung Park, "Hoe-jang-nim bo-jeung-eun ppae-dal-ra" dae-gi-eop-deul dae-chul
sa-ju-bo-jeung gwan-haeng ban-gi ["No More Guarantees by Our Chairman"
Conglomerates Object to Custom of Controlling Shareholders Personally Guaranteeing
Company Loans], KYUNGHYANG SINMUN, Sept. 10, 1996, at 8.
88 Daewoo, for example, would engage in country-wide projects in which the entire
conglomerate would participate. Seong-Dong Kim & Jeong-Hwan Bae, Kim-woo-choong-ui
beop-nyul dae-ri-in Seok-jin-gang, ban-gyeok-ha-da [Counterattack by Jin-Gang Seok, Woo
Choong Kim 's Legal Representative], MONTHLY CHOSUN, Apr. 2001, at 197.
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support weaker affiliates when in need.
Finally, chaebols engaged in various forms of "earnings management."
Financial figures were inflated partially due to historical reasons.
Following the Japanese model, policymakers granted chaebols exclusive
rights to establish general trading companies based upon the volume of
revenues, assets, sales, and stated capital. 89 Size, not profitability, was the
key determinant. Bureaucrats similarly condoned window-dressing to
receive licenses, permits, and commercial lending, particularly when it was
related to attracting precious foreign capital. 90 With the emphasis on
growth, companies were allowed to inflate records and manipulate balance
sheets through related-party transactions to obtain extensions when maturity
dates approached. Consolidated financial statements were not required, so
a single asset could be sold through a chain of companies, generating
artificial sales for all the companies involved.
D. Fatal Decisions During the Asian Financial Contagion
As the financial contagion swept across Asia in the late 1990s,
Daewoo made grave misjudgments-condoned by the government-which
sealed its fate. First, it pursued a counterstrategy of expansion with
particular focus on the automobile industry that proved too ambitious. 91
Daewoo then over-leveraged itself with $20 billion in debt to try to meet its
financial burdens during the crisis.92 Its management did not appreciate the
seriousness of the situation, offering restructuring plans to resurrect the
conglomerate only when it was too late. In the end, everyone stood by as
Daewoo transformed into a financial black hole over a two-year period.
In late 1997, the Korean won plummeted from 900 won to 1,960 won
to the dollar in less than four months. 93 As a result, Korea-the proud
country that was hailed for its economic miracle-capitulated to a bailout
led by the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), the World Bank, and the
Asian Development Bank, consisting of over $58 billion.94 The IMF's
controversial prescription raised interest rates to over 30% in an attempt to
stem capital flight.95 Korea experienced negative 6.9% growth in 1998, the
89 DONG-SUNG CHO, HAN-GUK-UI JONG-HAP-MU-YEOK-SANG-SA [KOREA'S GENERAL
TRADING COMPANIES] 21-22, 272 (1983).
90 Sull et al., supra note 2, at 2.
91 Lee, supra note 20, at 20; William Pesek Jr., Commentary: Laying Daewoo 's Ghost to
Rest, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 20, 2005, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/06
/1 9/bloomberg/sxpesek.php.
92 Lee, supra note 20, at 22.
93 Federal Reserve Board, Foreign Exchange Rates: South Korea Historical Rates,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/hist/dat96_ko.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2008).
94 David T. Coe & Se-Jik Kim, Introduction, in KOREAN CRISIS AND RECOVERY 2 (David
T. Coe & Se-Jik Kim eds., 2002).
95 Chae-Shick Chung & Se-Jik Kim, New Evidence on High Interest Rate Policy During
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worst in its modem history.
96
The timing could not have been worse for Daewoo. It might have
weathered the storm had it restructured from the onset in early 1998. 9'
Rejecting a contractional approach, Woo Choong Kim instinctively pursued
aggressive growth, particularly in the automobile industry. He declared that
"Daewoo will overcome the crisis through expansionist measures [like in
the past]," because given the opportunity "[w]e cannot embrace the future if
we flinch at a time of recession. Returning to his roots, Kim viewed the
crisis as a chance for Daewoo to acquire distressed companies and turn
them around. One commentator noted that "Daewoo's response to the
crisis came straight out of its old playbook: cooperate with the government,
acquire failed companies to expand, and continue to borrow."
99
While others retracted, Daewoo Group's sales increased by 25% in
1998 and Daewoo Corp.'s, by 54%.I0 The group spent 10 trillion won
($7.14 billion) in sales promotions during this critical period. 0 1
Automobile-related expansion in particular overwhelmed the
conglomerate. 102  Daewoo Motor acquired Ssangyong Motor in January
1998 at the peak of the crisis, assuming a 3.4 trillion won ($2.43 billion) in
debt. 10 3 Leading companies such as Daewoo Corp. and Daewoo Heavy
Industries bore the burden. 0 4  All companies pressured employees to
purchase Daewoo automobiles. 10 5  Executives personally marketed cars
the Korean Crisis, in KOREAN CRISIS AND RECOVERY, supra note 94, at 137.
96 Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System, http://ecos.bok.or.kr/jsp/use/koreco
/KorEcoPopUp.jsp?tableId=T_ECOGRO (last visited Feb. 16, 2008).
97 Lee, supra note 20, at 165.
98 Michael Schuman & Jane L. Lee, South Korea, Eager to Shed Its Old Ways, Allows a
Corporate Empire's Overhaul, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 1999, at 1, 3.
99 Lee, supra note 20, at 164.
100 1999 GOVERNMENT REPORT, supra note 49, at 1.
101 Lee, supra note 20, at 165.
102 Daewoo had also attempted to enter the oil refinery business by acquiring Hanwha
Energy. See Daewoo, Acquiring Ansaldo (Italy), supra note 39.
103 See Lee, supra note 38. Daewoo also bought an expensive new automobile factory in
Vietnam. Howard W. French, With Daewoo, a Twilight of Korean Conglomerates;
Dismantling of Yesterday's Economic Engines, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1999, at C 1.
104 DAEWOO SUICIDE, supra note 12, at 207-08.
105 In August 1998, the KFTC fined Daewoo Corp. 5.1 billion won ($3.6 million) for
providing interest-free loans to employees that purchased Daewoo cars through Daewoo
Motor Sales between April 1997 and May 1998. A shareholder suit against Woo Choong
Kim for his role in this improper support was dismissed in November 2004 because he was
not a registered director of Daewoo Corp. at the time. SUN-WOONG KIM, CENTER FOR GOOD
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, DAEWOO (Ju) JU-JU DAE-PYO SO-SONG-E-SEO NA-TA-NAN SA-SIL-
SANG EI-SA-E DAE-HAN CHAEK-IM-CHU-GUNG-EUI HAN-GEA [THE LIMITATIONS OF SEEKING
ACCOUNTABILITY AGAINST DE FACTO DIRECTORS AS DEMONSTRATED IN THE SHAREHOLDER
DERIVATIVE ACTION AGAINST DAEWOO CORP.] (2004) (S. Korea).
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with sales results linked to their performance evaluations. 
106
Daewoo's financial balancing act foundered under the weight of the
financial contagion.10 7 First, debt burden more than doubled due to the
plummeting Korean won. At the time, the group had $5.1 billion in foreign
currency loans and $1.9 billion in foreign currency debt to foreign bond
owners. 1 08  Second, the spike in interest rates further debilitated the
conglomerate, with its interest burden ballooning from 3 trillion won ($2.14
billion) to 6 trillion won ($4.3 billion). 0 9 Finally, Daewoo reportedly failed
to collect payment on several large-scale projects such as $3 billion owed
by Libya and $1 billion owed by Pakistan. 10 Relatively constant operating
profits aside, the collective financial burden overwhelmed Daewoo.
To meet the demands, Daewoo issued a flurry of corporate bonds and
commercial paper throughout 1998 to cover its maturing debts. Despite
high leverage, it still managed to raise 19.7 trillion won ($14.1 billion) in
debt issuances at interest rates that averaged 15% and reached as high as
25%. 1 In the third quarter of 1998 alone, Daewoo issued over 9.2 trillion
won ($6.57 billion) in bonds, raising its total debt by 40%112 and accounting
for 27% of total bond issues at the time.'1 3 Investment trusts and other
institutions recklessly acquired the debt instruments, apparently relying on
the assumption that the government would devise a solution." 1
4
106 DAEWOO SUICIDE, supra note 12, at 319.
107 In an ominous interview in 1985, Woo Choong Kim himself discussed how
companies that rely upon foreign debt can be susceptible to foreign shocks. Dae-Jung Kim,
Geun-geo-eop-neun Daewoo hae-che-seol-e si-dal-ri-neun Kim-woo-choong-eun mal-han-
da [Plagued with Rumors of Daewoo 's Dismantlement Woo-Choong Kim Speaks], MONTHLY
CHOSUN, May 1985, at 156, 168.
108 1999 GOVERNMENT REPORT, supra note 49, at 2, 17. When the exchange rate
collapsed from 700 won to 1400 won to the dollar, Daewoo's attorney claimed that
Daewoo's foreign debt exposure of $28.57 billion jumped from 20 trillion won to 40 trillion
won, although this figure seems exaggerated. Kim & Bae, supra note 88, at 204.
109 1999 GOVERNMENT REPORT, supra note 49, at 2.
110 Dong-han Lee, Gim-u-jung-hoe-jang "han-guk-en-ron-gwa-neun in-te-vu-sa-jul"
[President Woo-Choong Kim "No Interviews with Korea Media "], WEEKLY CHOSUN, Sept.
9, 1999, at 1569; Dong-Han Lee, Choe-cho-gong-gae byeo-rang-e seon Kim-woo-choong-ui
geok-jeong-to-ro [Revealed for the First Time: Standing on the Edge Woo-Choong Kim
Reveals His Concerns], MONTHLY CHOSUN, Sept. 1999, at 168.
111 1999 GOVERNMENT REPORT, supra note 49, at 2. In 1997, Daewoo had issued 12
trillion won ($8 billion) worth of commercial paper. Id.
12 Jong-Hak Hong, Jeong-bu-ui jae-beol (gi-ub) gae-hyeok jag-ub-pyeong-ga
[Evaluation of the Government's Work on Reforming Chaebol (Companies)], MONTHLY
KYUNG-SIL-RYEON, Mar. 2001, available at http://microeconomics.co.kr/bbs/zboard.php?id
=mic-sub05&page=6&snl=&divpage= 1&sn=off&ss=on&sc=on&selectarrange=headnum
&desc=asc&no=8.
113 KOH, supra note 48, at 2.
114 The entire bond market later paralyzed when Daewoo went into default, and while
sizable, commercial bank exposure to Daewoo corporate bonds was not as significant. Jin-
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In July 1998, after months of delay, the government finally acted to
stem the hemorrhaging conglomerate. Regulators restricted financial
institutions from holding more than 5% of the commercial paper of a
conglomerate. 15 In October, a similar restriction followed for corporate
bonds when banks and insurance companies were subject to a 5% holding
limit ?er conglomerate, while investment trusts were subject to a 15%
limit .6 Although Daewoo had been in discussion with the regulators about
its financing woes since June 1998, it did not-or could not-prepare for
such austerity measures.' 17 The caps on debt severed the financing lifeline
that had been sustaining the group." 8 To aggravate matters, Chairman Kim
was suddenly hospitalized in November 1998."9
In December 1998, the government attempted to broker a controversial
"big deal" between Samsung Group and Daewoo Group in which troubled
Samsung Motors would be swapped in exchange for Daewoo Electronics.
120
The government believed that encouraging Daewoo Motor and Samsung
Motors to merge could revive the ailing companies through synergy and
economies of scale. Policymakers also believed this could force Daewoo to
focus its efforts on the automobile industry.' 2' Daewoo meanwhile hoped
to extract major concessions from the government to consummate the deal,
but negotiations collapsed when Samsung withdrew from the talks.1
22
Twelve months after the Asian financial crisis erupted, Daewoo made
its first serious attempt at restructuring in late December 1998 when it
entered into a Financial Structure Improvement Covenant with its creditor
banks. 123 Daewoo agreed to downsize fifty-one companies into ten core
entities that would focus on trade and construction, automobiles, heavy
industries, and finance and services. These efforts, however, were
inadequate and overdue, and failed to yield substantive results. In
Bae Choi, Financial Crisis in Korea and the Restructuring, 18 KYUNG SUNG UNIV. Bus. &
ECON. RES. 21, 21 (2002).
115 Sung-Woong Moon, Dae-chul-geum-ri in-ha juk-kek-yu-do [Active Inducement to
Decrease Loan Interest Rates], MUNHWA ILBO, July 30, 1998, at 2.
116 Lee, supra note 20, at 171-72.
117 Id. at 171.
118 KOH, supra note 48, at 2.
119 Kim Woo-Choong Recovers Quickly from Surgery, KOREA TIMES, Nov. 17, 1998, at 8.
120 Jae-Yeol Lee, Samsung-Daewoo Big-deal 'Jun-won go-yong-seung-gye" [Big Deal
between Samsung and Daewoo "Retain the Entire Labor Force "], KOREA TIMES, Dec. 16,
1998, at 27. The concept "big deal" was apparently first suggested in a November 1997 op-
ed piece. Dong-Sung Cho, 'IMF si-dae' saeng-jon-jun-rauk ['IMF Generation' Survival
Strategy], CHOSUN ILBO, Nov. 26, 1997, at 5.
121 DAEWOO SUICIDE, supra note 12, at 108.
122 This plan apparently failed after Samsung allegedly received documents from a
disgruntled former Daewoo Electronics manager that detailed over 4 trillion won ($2.86
billion) in accounting fraud. DAEWOO SUICIDE, supra note 12, at 181.
123 Choi, supra note 114, at 31.
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September 1998, Kim even became the chairman of the FKI, the powerful
business organization led by chaebols, yet FKI's influence did little to help
Daewoo's reorganization.
In July 1999, Kim then announced that he would relinquish 1.3 trillion
won ($1.08 billion) of his personal equity in Daewoo companies.124 His
final proposal to salvage the conglomerate involved the breaking up of the
conglomerate and selling off its companies with only the automobile
company remaining. In return, Kim demanded over 10 trillion won ($8.3
billion) in the form of stock, real estate, and other assets to be used as the
last injection to reorganize the group. A year had already elapsed since the
government curtailed its financing and began close supervision of the
group. Yet, the Financial Supervisory Service ("FSS") approved the
rollover of 6 trillion won ($5 billion) of short-term commercial paper for six
months and 4 trillion won ($3.3 billion) in additional funding.125  The
government, to no avail, tried to sustain the beleaguered conglomerate.
126
Weeks later in August, twelve main companies of Daewoo proceeded into
court receivership workout procedures. 27  Representative directors
submitted their resignations on November 1, 1999 and shortly thereafter
Kim left Korea to begin his life as a fugitive. 128
E. Accounting Fraud and the British Finance Corporation
While pursuing its expansion strategy through excessive borrowing,
Daewoo chose to commit an unprecedented fraud, particularly by
manipulating its overseas accounts. Many chaebols shared the legacy of
accounting opacity, but what distinguished Daewoo was its scale, its
manner, and how it remained undetected. 29 The "biggest accounting fraud
in history" occurred as Daewoo's companies inflated assets by a total 22.9
trillion won ($19.1 billion). 30 Daewoo Corp., Daewoo Motor, and Daewoo
124 Park, supra note 16, at 104-15.
125 Instead of being injected into business activities and reorganization, some of these
funds were allegedly used to compensate unpaid employee wages. Kim & Song, supra note
84, at 682.
126 Yet, this only delayed the company's sale on potentially more beneficial terms. See
Stephanie Strom, Skepticism over Korean Reform; After Daewoo Intervention, Is There the
Will for Austerity?, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1999, at C 1.
127 Doo-Young Kim and Jung-Hyun Park, Gim-u-jung-ssi nae-il-gyu-kuk: Daewoo-gu-
rup whe-mol-rak-haet-na [Woo Choong Kim Returns Tomorrow: Why Did Daewoo Group
Go Bankrupt?], DONGA.COM, June 13, 2005, http://www.donga.com/fbin/output?f=bts&n
=200506130127.
128 Id.
129 See generally French, supra note 103.
130 Kraar, supra note 1, at 103. See generally Ward, supra note 3; Press Release,
Securities and Futures Comm'n, Daewoo-gye-yeol 12-sa-e dae-han gam-sa-bo-go-seo teuk-
byeol-gam-ri-gyeol-gwa mit jo-chi [Special Audit Results of Audit Reports of 12 Daewoo
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Electronics together accounted for 90% of the conglomerate's impaired
capital.13' In perpetrating the fraud, Daewoo Corp., which was responsible
for 14.6 trillion won ($12.2 billion) in fraud, used its trading and
management departments and its accounts in London. In 1997, for
example, it deflated assets by 10.1 trillion won ($6.7 billion) and liabilities
by over 22.9 trillion won ($15.3 billion), and inflated equity by over 12.8
trillion won ($8.53 billion) to conceal 10.1 trillion won ($6.73 billion) in
impaired capital.132  This transpired while net losses for the company
climbed from 11.8 trillion won ($7.87 billion) in 1997 to 12.1 trillion won
($8.64 billion) in 1998.1
33
On the domestic side, most of the fraud stemmed from reduction of
debts, manipulation of export returns, and utilization of affiliates. Some of
the largest violations involved 15 trillion won ($12.5 billion) in off-balance
sheet liabilities.' 34  Related-party transactions were also used for "asset
swaps among Daewoo subsidiaries at exaggerated values.' 35  Stronger
affiliates would prop up weaker companies by purchasing overvalued assets
above market prices. Furthermore, scam subsidiaries were used to skirt
accounting rules. Financial companies such as Seoul Investment Trust
Management ("SITM") played a key role in the transactions. 1
36
To a greater degree, Daewoo mobilized its overseas financial network.
Affiliates and Action] 3 (Sept. 15, 2000) [hereinafter SFC 2000 Report] (on file with author).
Unlike the FSC's preliminary audit of Daewoo, the final SFC 2000 Report only contains a
skeletal account of the accounting fraud and does not contain information as to how assets
were inflated or debt underreported. The SFC's final figures also did not include
approximately 20 trillion won ($16.7 billion) that was considered accounting fraud in the
FSC's 1999 report. The SFC claimed they excluded this amount because the FSC's 1999
report had applied the Corporate Accounting Standards too strictly. Yet, the size of the
discrepancy still remains puzzling.
131 Daewoo Corp. had impaired capital of 14.6 trillion won ($12 billion) whereas Daewoo
Motor and Daewoo Electronics accounted for another 8.4 trillion won ($7 billion). 1999
GOVERNMENT REPORT, supra note 49, at 6.
132 Judgment of July 24, 2001, 2001 Gohab 171 (Seoul Dist. Court), at 13. In 1998, the
window-dressing continued in a similar manner as assets were deflated by over 0.77 trillion
won ($0.55 billion), liabilities were deflated by over 13.4 trillion won ($9.6 billion), and
equity was inflated by over 14.2 trillion won ($10 billion) to cover 10.3 trillion won ($7.4
billion) in impaired capital. Id. at 19.
133 Id.
134 SFC 2000 Report, supra note 130, at 4. Other violations involved 4 trillion won
($3.33 billion) of non-performing loans, 3 trillion won ($2.5 billion) of false inventories, and
I trillion won ($0.83 billion) in false research and development expenses. DAEWOO SUICIDE,
supra note 12, at 160.
135 Lee, supra note 20, at 162.
136 In 1998 and 1999, SITM, for example, used up to 38% of its funds to support Daewoo
affiliates and purchased 2.9 trillion won ($2.42 billion) of bonds and commercial paper
issued by various Daewoo affiliates, particularly when they were among the riskiest. Lee,
supra note 20, at 154. Although SITM was not technically a Daewoo subsidiary, it was
under Daewoo's control since the late 1980s. Id. at 178 n.3.
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The primary vehicle for the overseas fraud involved an entity called the
British Finance Corporation ("BFC"). 137 Located in London, five people in
the finance department of Daewoo Corp. oversaw its secretive business. 138
The BFC's intricate accounts acted as the nerve center for most of the
conglomerate's financial machinations. 139 What began as a construction
account was later commingled with trading accounts.14 0  The BFC later
grew to an amalgamation of thirty-seven foreign accounts. By 1996, annual
borrowings from the BFC accounts totaled between $6 billion and $7
billion. 14 1  Toward the end in August 1999, the accounts reportedly
amounted to over $7.69 billion.
142
The BFC and overseas affiliates were employed in a variety of ways.
Foreign subsidiaries, for example, transferred funds borrowed from foreign
banks to the BFC. This circumvented Korean foreign exchange laws and
skirted reporting requirements. 143 In addition, companies with questionable
credits issued new stock that overseas financial institutions would acquire,
technically as equity investments. 144 The equities would then be secured
through redemption agreements with other affiliates. 145  The affiliates
would be obligated to repurchase the equity at a given price plus interest, if
it failed to reach a certain price level. 1 In essence, the equity investment
operated like a loan guaranteed by an affiliate. The scheme allowed
Daewoo to avoid prudential regulations that governed chaebol borrowing in
foreign currencies. Funds that should have been recorded as debts were
improperly recorded as equities.
When overseas business operations declined and more pressing debts
137 Surprisingly, most of the financial records of the BFC were intact when regulators
later found them in storage. It remains unclear why this information was not destroyed.
DAEWOO SUICIDE, supra note 12, at 162-63.
138 2001 Gohab 171, at 7. Around a dozen accounts were established in the names of
Daewoo and the BFC in 1982. The name BFC apparently originated from the telex code of
the finance team in the United Kingdom. Yeong-Bae Kim, Daewoo BFC-e-seo bi-ja-geum
tan-saeng? [Slush Funds Came From Daewoo's BFC?], HANKYOREH 21, Jun. 28, 2005,
available at http://h21 .hani.co.kr/section-021106000/2005/06/021106000200506210565094
.html.
IN Judgment of Nov. 29, 2002, 2001 No 2063 (Seoul High Court), at 58; 2001 Gohab
171, at 7.
140 Initially, the accounts received deposits of progress payments for construction
contracts in Libya. 2001 No 2063, at 47.
14 1 2001 Gohab 171, at 23.
142 DAEWOO SUICIDE, supra note 12, at 164. Of this, Daewoo's attorney claimed $3.4
billion was used for repaying debts and interest and $4.1 billion was used to support other
subsidiaries. Kim & Bae, supra note 88.
143 Kim & Bae, supra note 88.
'44 2001 No 2063, at 58.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 59.
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from overseas entities emerged, receivables from exports that should have
been credited to domestic affiliates were instead diverted to BFC
accounts. 147  Foreign debts held priority over domestic obligations.
148
Overseas interest payments to foreign financial institutions alone amounted
to $2.49 billion in 1999.149 Pressure from the BFC exacerbated the
financial state of Daewoo's domestic companies. Later when foreign debts
could no longer be met, the BFC-related paper companies were used to
construct falsified bills of lading, commercial invoices, and packing lists to
defraud Korean banks. 150 Daewoo commingled real commercial documents
with falsified ones to sustain the deception. 51 BFC personnel, meanwhile,
worked under utmost secrecy.
52
Despite the BFC's meticulous records, the whereabouts of
approximately $753 million remains unknown. 53 Speculation abounds that
this money was used as corporate slush funds for political lobbying
purposes. Others believe that Woo Choong Kim and senior managers
siphoned off these funds for personal enrichment.i 54 In 2006, a court in fact
held that a special "KC (King of Chairman)" account established among the
BFC accounts was used for personal expenses of Chairman Kim and his
family. 55
Overall, operation of the BFC accounts contravened several key laws
in Korea. First, executives violated accounting laws. 156 Through the BFC,
they did not record or consolidate approximately 5 to 8 trillion won ($4.17
to 6.7 billion) per year of off-balance sheet liabilities between 1996 and
1999.157  Second, executives violated the law prohibiting "hiding of
147 Id. at 48.
148 Id. at 49-50.
149 DAEWOO SUICIDE, supra note 12, at 164.
ISo 2001 No 2063, at 42.
151 Given the extensive amount of bills of exchanges discounted, bank officers had
difficulty in detecting the fraud. Id. at 43.
152 The court held that this was an incriminating behavior which shows they knew they
were committing improper acts. Id. at 47-49.
153 DAEWOO SUICIDE, supra note 12, at 165.
154 See Mun-Seong Kim, Bu-sil-gi-eop-gyeong-yeong-jin jae-san-eun-nik deungjeok-bal
[Discovered Concealed Property of Delinquent Company Executives], YONHAP NEWS, July
20, 2001.
155 2005 Gohab 588, at 51; see infra Part M.A.
156 See, e.g., Judgment of Jan. 13, 2005, 2000 Gahap 78858 (Seoul Dist. Court), at 19;
2002 Do 7262, at 4-6; Securities Exchange Act, Law No. 2920 of 1976 (as amended Law
No. 7114 of 2004) (S. Korea); Act for External Audit of Stock Companies Law, Law No.
3297 of 1980 (as amended Law No. 6991 of 2003) (S. Korea) [hereinafter External Audit
Act]; Act on Aggravated Punishment for Certain Economic Crimes, Law No. 3693 of 1983
(as amended Law No. 7311 of 2004) (S. Korea) [hereinafter Aggravated Punishment Act].
157 DAEWOO SUICIDE, supra note 12, at 163-64.
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personal property overseas" without appropriate disclosure.158  They
asserted that they had not violated the law, because the BFC accounts were
not concealed for any illicit purpose and were set up solely to repay
company debts. 159 They repaid foreign loans with funds obtained by selling
debts to local banks and investment management companies such as
SITM. 160  Courts rejected the argument because disclosure laws applied
irrespective of an intention to repatriate missing funds later.' 6' The law
required accurate reporting so that authorities had sufficient information to
make policy judgments."' Finally, the BFC accounts violated Korean
foreign currency laws. None of the accounts received official approval by
the Ministry of Finance and Economy ("MOFE") as required under foreign
exchange regulations. 63 Not only did Daewoo executives transfer funds
out of the country to cover BFC's debt without government permission,
they also fabricated documents to conceal such transfers. 
64
III. INEFFECTUAL INTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Daewoo's misjudgments and accounting troubles serve as a reminder
of the catastrophic cost of neglecting good corporate governance. Weak
internal corporate governance in particular was a common feature for many
chaebol conglomerates leading up to the financial crisis. Internal corporate
governance structures established under Koran corporate law did not
function to check and balance controlling shareholder mismanagement.
Representative directors, boards, statutory auditors, and shareholders alike
did not act as effective monitors. Subsequently, internal corporate
governance has improved significantly through legal reforms combined
with an effective enforcement regime.
A. Controlling Shareholder's Imperial Control
As with most chaebol heads, Daewoo's founder and controlling
shareholder, Woo Choong Kim, reigned in an imperial fashion. 65  He
158 Aggravated Punishment Act, art. 4, 1 (S. Korea); see Judgment of July 8, 2004,
2002 Do 661 (Supreme Court).
159 2001 Gohab 171, at 44.
60 See DAEwOO SUICIDE, supra note 12, at 70-71.
161 Judgment of Feb. 14, 1989, 88 Do 2211 (Supreme Court); Judgment of June 21, 1988,
88 Do 551 (Supreme Court); 2001 Gohab 171, at 45; 2001 No 2063, at 48-49.
162 On appeal, the High Court and the Supreme Court both affirmed the lower court's
judgment. 2001 No 2063, at 45; 2002 Do 7262, at 10-11.
163 Foreign Currency Management Act, Law No. 933 of 1961 (repealed by Law No. 5550
of 1998; replaced by Foreign Currency Transaction Act, Law No. 5551 of 1998) (S. Korea).
164 By creating fictitious import transactions, Daewoo transferred funds as payments to its
paper companies abroad, who in turn sent the money to a BFC account. 2001 Gohab 171, at
23. 165 This contrasts with the U.S. companies where the entrenched inside managers tend to
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operated the conglomerate with total command, unchecked and
unsupervised.166 He pressed the campaign to expand internationally,
particularly in the crucial period leading up to and during the Asian
financial crisis. The crisis exposed the weakness of the concentrated
governance structure when his judgment faltered. Single-handedly, he was
able to drive the conglomerate to perpetrate the largest accounting fraud in
world history. Although Daewoo's business was run with an international
focus, Kim's dominance of internal corporate governance fell far short of
global standards.
Kim held the formal title of "Daewoo Group Chairman." As the head
of the conglomerate, he acted as the de facto chairman of the boards of all
Daewoo companies.167 He conducted all the major decision-making of the
conglomerate through the Group Chairman's Office that consisted of some
100 personnel conscripted from each affiliate. Serving as his personal
secretariat, the Chairman's Office oversaw senior personnel decisions,
financing decisions, and business strategies. 168 Representative directors and
board members, for example, were not nominated by boards or through
annual general shareholder meetings, but through the Chairman's Office at
the end of the year. 169 This happened weeks before annual shareholder
meetings that rubber-stamped approval in any event. Kim wielded
"absolute influence over the careers" of the executives.7 0 Similarly, the
Chairman's Office maintained exclusive control over operation of the
BFC. 171 The concentration of power in the Chairman's Office therefore
allowed Kim to order executives to commit the accounting fraud. 172 Such
reign in an unrivaled fashion. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 10, at 467.
166 Jong-Se Park, Geum-gam-wi-ga bon Daewoo [Daewoo in the Eyes of the Financial
Supervisory Commission], WEEKLY CHOSUN, Apr. 15, 1999, at 34.
167 Serving as a de facto director (as opposed to a formal director) also allowed the
chairman to escape liability in a derivative suit filed by minority shareholders. KiM, supra
note 105. Legally, he served as the registered Representative Director of Daewoo Corp.,
Daewoo Heavy Industries, and Daewoo Motor at the time of the crisis.
168 According to one assessment, "[h]e is almost compulsively hands-on in running his
company.... " Tim Healy & Laxmi Nakarmi, Wrong Man for the Job?, ASIAWEEK, Aug.
13, 1999. Daewoo's Chairman's Office was far more decentralized relative to other major
chaebols. Sin-ip-sa-won-bu-teo si-jak-han sing-keu taeng-keu: Daewoo-geu-rup hoe-jang-
bi-seo-sil i-kkeu-neun 7-in [A Think Tank Where They Started as Entry Level Employees:
The 7 Persons that Lead the Daewoo Group's Chairman's Office], WEEKLY CHOSUN, May
28, 1997, at 60-61.
169 Jung-Soo Kwak, 'Hwang-jae-kyeong-yeong' eon-jae-kka-ji ["Imperial Management'
Until When], HANKYOREH, Dec. 15, 2000, at 21.
170 2001 No 2063, at 80; Judgment of Jan. 11, 2002, 2001 No 2062 (Seoul High Court),
at 6; Judgment of Aug. 30, 2001, 2001 No. 1022 (Seoul High Court), at 9; 2001 Gohab 171,
at 54.
171 DAEWOO SUICIDE, supra note 12, at 174.
172 2001 Gohab 171, at 8; 2001 No. 1022, at 9 (noting that one of the defendants to the
accounting fraud committed the crime by following an order by Chairman Kim, which was
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abuse of power had existed in the past, but has worsened due to a changing
of the guard at the conglomerate's senior levels. 173  Originally, Kim
surrounded himself with a host of key advisors who had been with him
from the early years in the 1960s and 1970s. They had grown together with
the conglomerate, many having been personally recruited from other
companies by Kim. Similar to or even older than Kim in age, many were
also alumni of the same schools. 174 Hence, they could be blunt with Kim
when necessary and act as informal checks and balances. In the early
1990s, however, a generational change began when these original
executives retired. The replacements, who rose through the rigid corporate
hierarchy as career Daewoo employees, could not as easily confront the
legendary founder, especially when the crisis unfolded. Chairman Kim was
able to control the conglomerate through a distorted and tenuous ownership
structure. In April 1997, Kim and his family members, as controlling
shareholders, only owned on average 6.1% of the shares in the major
companies within the Daewoo Group. Daewoo companies apparently did
not seek equity financing due to concerns that this might dilute Kim's weak
ownership position. 176  Kim maintained control through affiliated
companies that on average cross-owned 31.2% of each other's shares and
treasury shares that accounted for an additional 1%.177 Combined with his
family ownership, he then could control on average 38.3% of the shares.
178
Hence, while labeled a concentrated ownership system, Daewoo and other
chaebols also exhibited attributes more associated with dispersed ownership
systems, such as exaggerated accounting. The low stock price of Daewoo
companies reflected not only lack of profitability, but also concerns
difficult to disobey).
173 Gi-Cheon Kim, Daewoo-geu-rup, choe-go-gyeong-yeong-cheung se-dae-gyo-che
[Daewoo Group, Generational Change in Senior Management], WEEKLY CHOSUN, Feb. 18,
1993, at 30; Healy & Nakarmi, supra note 168; Clifford, supra note 41, at 53.
174 See infra Part II.B.
175 Kim, supra note 78, at 100. Kim in fact took pride in his meager stake because he
considered himself a professional manager instead of an owner. Moon-Soon Kim, Jae-beol-
ui in-gan-hak: Daewoo-geu-rup Gim-u-jung-hoe-jang, [Anthropology of a Chaebol: Daewoo
Group Chairman Woo-Choong Kim], WEEKLY CHOSUN, Nov. 3, 1985, at 10, 13-14; Kim,
supra note 107, at 166.
176 Lee, supra note 20, at 176. Equity financing might not have been a viable option
given the lack of attractiveness of Daewoo shares.
177 SEUNG-No CHOI, HAN-GUK-UI DAE-GYU-MO-GI-EOB-JIB-DAN [KOREA'S LARGE
CONGLOMERATE GROUPS] 144 tbl.5-2 (1997).
178 Id. at 144. Other controlling families among the top thirty chaebols also retained
control through affiliated companies, but on average they controlled a combined stake of
43%. Kim's combined controlling stake of 38.3% was among the smallest of the top thirty
chaebols. The KFTC began regulating this cross-ownership of chaebols starting in 1997.
See KIM ET AL., supra note 79. This type of cross-ownership structure remains
commonplace for Asian conglomerates in general. Stijn Claessens & Joseph Fan, Corporate
Governance in Asia: A Survey, 3 INT'L REv. FIN. 71, 74 (2002).
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surrounding the distorted ownership structure.
Notwithstanding his imperial position, Kim did make many exemplary
decisions. First, Kim declared when he founded Daewoo that he would not
transfer the reins of corporate control to any of his family members. 179 He
believed his successor should be a professional manager chosen based on
merit. He trained managers and delegated authority to chief executives
accordingly. 80  Subsequently, Kim withdrew all his relatives from
executive positions throughout the conglomerate.'18  His anti-nepotistic
succession plan and management philosophy distinguished him from other
chaebol heads who viewed chaebols as personal possessions subject to
dynastic succession.' 82  To them, the interests of shareholders and
stakeholders to have the most competent managers leading the company or
the possibility that an heir might be unqualified were secondary issues.
Hereditary entitlement to control was considered an established fact, even
for publicly listed companies. Although he displayed an unwillingness to
relinquish control until it was too late, Kim's professional approach was a
novelty. Unfortunately, Daewoo's collapse denied him the opportunity to
fulfill this pledge that would have had a tremendous impact on the
corporate environment of Korea.
Second, in 1980 Kim donated over 20 billion won ($22.2 million) to
179 Kim first publicly announced this pledge in 1984. Han-guk-ui hu-gye-ja: Gim-u-jung
Daewoo-geu-rup-hoe-jang hu-gye-ja-neun nu-ga-doe-na [Korea's Successors: Who will be
Successor to Woo-Choong Kim, Daewoo Group Chairman?], WEEKLY CHOSUN, Sept. 23,
1984, at 15 [hereinafter Korea's Successors]; DAEWOO SUICIDE, supra note 12, at 248.
180 Aguilar & Cho, supra note 2, at 6 ("Daewoo considered itself to have gone much
further than any other large Korean firm in developing professional management .. "); see
Sang-Gyun Nam, Daewoo-geu-rup 40-dae hu-gye-ja deung-jang-seol pa-da [Daewoo
Group: Rumors Rife of a 40-Year-Old Successor], WEEKLY CHOSUN, Sept. 10, 1989, at 24
(discussing a list of executives who were considered as possible successors to Kim).
181 Korea's Successors, supra note 179, at 18. One of Kim's older brothers did serve as
president of a Daewoo affiliate from 1976 to 1981 and then later as president of Ajou
University, a school owned by the Daewoo Educational Foundation, after a distinguished
career at another leading university. Another brother acquired a Daewoo company and went
independent. Only Kim's wife, who managed the Hilton Hotel, and Kim's youngest brother
served in Daewoo for a substantial period of time. Id.; see also Moon-Soon Kim, supra note
175, at 14.
182 In 1969, Yuhan Corporation founder Ilhan Yu became what is considered the first
major corporate leader not to transfer control of his company to any of his heirs. Jae-Rok
Park, Yu-il-han-ei wi-up-gua gye-seung-bal-geon [Yu llhan's Achievement and Continuous
Development], in YU-IL-HAN YEON-GU 253, 264-66 (1994). No modem-day examples could
be found of non-hereditary inheritance of control in a leading chaebol. Cases of siblings or
son-in-laws succeeding have existed, while, other than wives succeeding their husbands on
occasion, female heirs assuming control has seldom occurred. Ju-Young Kim, Huel-yeun-e
ui-han Kyong-young-kwon-seung-gae-wa Ga-jok-gi-up-ui Kyong-young-sung-gwa
[Hereditary Inheritance of Control and Achievement of Family-Controlled Corporations], 31
CG REVIEW (2007), http://www.cgs.or.kr/review/0703/hotissue.asp.
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the non-profit Daewoo Foundation that he had established in 1978.183 The
donation consisted of the bulk of his Daewoo Corp. shares that amounted to
17.5 billion won ($19.4 million). 184 The foundation's mandate provided for
it to engage in public interest activities, primarily by conducting social
welfare programs.1 85  It established hospitals, supported museums,
constructed low-income housing projects, and supported academic research.
Ostensibly, Kim established the foundation as a philanthropic effort to
repatriate his wealth back to society.
Third, Kim and his senior executives did not engage in widespread
plundering. 86  Exhaustive investigations by prosecutors, regulators,
creditors, and investors have uncovered only evidence of relatively small-
scale misappropriation.187 This contrasted with many other chaebols where
personal enrichment by controlling shareholders and executives played a
direct role in their collapses. The secretive BFC funds, for example, were
allegedly used only to help the conglomerate.' 88 Kim loyalists also argue
that gross accounting and loan frauds were committed for Daewoo and not
for personal benefit. 1-89
Critics, however, hold a more cynical view toward the donations,
suggesting that they served ulterior purposes. At the time, the move
allowed Kim to avoid a crackdown by the authoritarian government by
preempting a threat to restrict his control. 90 The faqade of a non-profit
organization also allowed him to maintain control over the group while
shielding his involvement. In October 1993, for example, compared to
183 Daewoo-geu-rup Gim-u-jung-hoe-jang sa-jae 200-eok sa-hoe-hwan-won [Daewoo
Group Chairman Woo-Choong Kim Returns to Society 20 Billion Won ($22.2 million) in
Personal Property], CHOSUN ILBO, Aug. 30, 1980, at 1. Initially called the Daewoo Cultural
Welfare Foundation, the name was changed to the Daewoo Foundation in October 1980,
when Kim donated an additional 20 billion won ($22.2 million) of assets for the expressed
purpose of developing and promoting basic academic studies. Moon-Soon Kim, supra note
175, at 13-15.
184 Moon-Soon Kim, supra note 175, at 13-14.
185 See The Daewoo Foundation: Introduction, http://www.daewoofound.com
/introduction/introduction.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2008).
186 DAEWOO SUICIDE, supra note 12, at 26-27. In contrast, the heads of many other
chaebols that collapsed during the financial crisis were often found guilty of considerable
embezzlement and expropriation.
187 During Kim's main trial, the court found evidence of embezzlement of approximately
$100 million mainly through the BFC accounts. 2005 Gohab 588, at 99.
"8' 2005 Gohap 588, at 96-98.
189 DAEWOO SUICIDE, supra note 12, at 207-08. Kim's relatively limited personal
expropriation has served as one reason why he continues to generate allegiance from former
Daewoo managers. Furthermore, Daewoo allegedly did not engage in real estate speculation
like other chaebols and apparently was also the first major chaebol to start hiring and
retaining married female employees. Kim, supra note 107, at 170. Daewoo labor union
workers and other victims nevertheless hold Kim highly culpable. See infra Part IV.D.




other foundations established by the top thirty chaebols, the Daewoo
Foundation owned the highest percentage of shares. 1 ' In 1990, it held
11.42% of Daewoo Corp., 2.6% of Daewoo Heavy Industries, and 4.3% of
Daewoo Investment Finance.192 Initially, it operated as the de facto holding
company of the conglomerate. 93 The foundation also acted as a tax shelter
against personal inheritance taxes, a loophole used by many chaebol
foundations. In fact, after the tax laws were amended, the foundation
reduced its stake in Daewoo Corp. from over 10% to 5.81% in August
1993.194 Finally, any support that the foundation enlisted from the listed
sister companies would have diluted Kim's philanthropic intentions behind
the foundation.1 95
Suspicions persist that Kim and his insiders reaped substantial private
benefits of control. First, allegedly over $753 million from the secretive
BFC accounts remain unaccounted for, even after a comprehensive audit by
the regulators.1 96 These funds could have been personally misused. In the
May 2006 decision, the Seoul District Court in fact held that Kim
embezzled over $116 million from a special BFC account. 197 Kim's family
used these funds for personal investments, artwork purchases, and real
estate acquisitions. Similarly, the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation
("KDIC") brought a civil action on behalf of the creditors related to $2.5
million in donations to Harvard University where Kim's son was attending,
and 19 billion won ($15.8 million) to Ajou University. Both donations
involved use of company funds for seemingly personal purposes without
191 Gong-ik-beop-in gye-yeol-sa ju-sik so-yu/Daewoo-jae-dan 1,275 eok choe-go [Non-
Profit Foundation Affiliates' Stocks Possession/Daewoo Foundation's 127.5 Billion Won is
the Largest], HANKYOREH, Oct. 6, 1993, at 7.
192 Hyun-Man Shin, Jo-sei-hweo-pi gweong-yeong-gwon an-jeon-e-jun gyeo-nyang
[Targeted as Tax Shelter and Means to Safely Transfer Control], HANKYOREH, Nov. 20.
1990, at 4. By December 1997, the Daewoo Foundation owned 4.5% of Daewoo Corp.,
3.1% of Daewoo Electronics, and 2.9% of Daewoo Heavy Industries, and Kim and his
family owned 7.1% of Daewoo Heavy Industries. Daewoo Corp. later emerged as the real
de facto holding company with its 37% ownership in Daewoo Motor and its 29.1%
ownership of Daewoo Heavy Industries. CHANG, supra note 82, at 305.
193 IN-HAK Yu, HAN-GUK-JAE-BEOL-UI HAE-BU [A DISSECTION OF KOREA'S CHAEBOL] 207
(1991). Until recently, Korea did not allow the creation of holding companies.
194 Daewoo-ju 260 man-ju mae-gak/Daewoo-jae-dan/gong-ik-beop-in gye-yeol-sa-ji-bae
gyu-je tta-ra [Daewoo Sold 2.6 Million Shares/Daewoo Foundation/Follows Regulations on
Control by Public Foundations Over Affiliates], KOOKMIN DAILY, Mar. 12, 1994, at 8.
195 See generally Shin, supra note 192.
"' DAEWOO SUICIDE, supra note 12, at 165. One preliminary assessment even claimed
that $4 billion of Daewoo's money could not be accounted for; see Peter Cordingley &
Laxmi Nakarmi, In Search ofDaewoo's Kim, ASIAWEEK, Feb. 16, 2001.
197 2005 Gohab 588, at 55, 57. $44.3 million of the BFC funds were redirected to a Hong
Kong paper company that served as a front for Kim. Id. at 51-52; Cheong-Mo Yoo,
Daewoo Founder Kim's Concealed Assets Worth W140 Bil. Uncovered, KOREA HERALD,
Nov. 9, 2001 at 13.
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board approval.198  Secondly, confidants, relatives, or pseudo-Daewoo
affiliates allegedly held most of Kim's personal assets by proxy.1 99 By
concealing such funds under third party names, Kim could thwart claims by
creditors. These assets conceivably could have originated from the
expropriated funds.
B. Ceremonial Directors, Representative Directors, and Statutory Auditors
Daewoo's boards of directors, representative directors, and statutory
auditors failed to understand and fulfill their roles as fiduciaries. They did
not act to stem the primary conflict that arose out of the controlling
shareholders taking advantage of non-controlling shareholders,
stakeholders, and others.20 0  As legal institutions established under
corporate law they should have acted as internal counterweights to the
domineering authority of the controlling shareholder. Instead, they
maintained a passive existence due to historical legacies, weaknesses in the
law, and a misguided understanding of their purpose.
Generally, Daewoo's directors, representative directors, and auditors
suffered the same problems that plagued most Korean companies. In
practice, boards did not formally function in a legal sense. 20 1 Boards did
not even hold official meetings. Upon receiving instructions from the
conglomerate's Chairman's Office, the office of planning of each affiliate
would draft fictional board minutes tailored accordingly. Minutes would be
''approved by the board" with personal seals of all the directors that the
offices of planning kept under their care. At best, directors could provide
198 Harvard has failed to return these funds. Jang-Jin Hwang, Activists Demand Harvard
Return Ex-Daewoo Chief's Donations, KOREA HERALD, May 30, 2002. In July 2001, KDIC
also claimed eight senior executives hid 10 billion won ($8.33 million) in assets. Kim, supra
note 154. On the issue of universities and non-profit organizations receiving tainted
corporate donations in America, see generally Ariana Eunjung Cha, Corporate Scandals
Tainting Donations, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2002, at Al.
199 DAEWOO SUICIDE, supra note 12, at 26-27; Jong-Su Kim, Yet-Daewoo-geu-rup wi-
jang-gye-yeol-sa 6-gae-sa jeok-bal [Six Sham Companies of Old Daewoo Group
Discovered], YON-AP NEWS, Jan. 25, 2002; Yeong-Ho Yun, Gim-u-jung 4430-man-bul
ppae-dol-ri-gi 'deul-tong'-nat-da [Woo-Choong Kim's Siphoning of $44.3 Million Has Been
'Exposed'], WEEKLY DONG-A, Nov. 15, 2001, at 10-12, available at http://www.donga.com
/docs/magazine/weekly-donga/news309/wd39ccO3O.html. At least six companies could
have been used as potential fronts for this scheme.
200 Korean companies faced a different agency problem from the standard Berle and
Means challenge in dispersed ownership countries that focused on the quandary surrounding
entrenched inside managers taking advantage of their position to the detriment of
shareholders. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 139-40 (1933).
201 "Board of directors of a Korean corporation, in a real sense, has not existed before
now." Michael Lewis, The World's Biggest Going-Out-of-Business Sale, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
May 31, 1998, at 34 (quoting a Daewoo spokesman).
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input through the representative director who would then relay such advice
to the chairman.
The internal supervisory structure, also, remained weak because at the
time companies did not distinguish between directors and officers, and had
no outside directors. The director position served as the highest possible
rung on the corporate ladder for an executive as senior officers were
promoted to become directors. Combining the two together into a unitary
position weakened their ability to act as checks and balances against each
other, and more importantly, over the controlling shareholder. In addition,
Korean companies as a general matter did not have any non-executive,
outside directors until 1998.202
A more serious problem was that directors and auditors were not
answerable to non-controlling shareholders or other stakeholders in any
meaningful way, and did not understand their obligations. Shareholder
litigation, particularly derivative actions, did not exist until 1997.2o3 The
lack of civil legal actions meant that fundamental obligations such as
fiduciary duty remained as unapplied, theoretical exercises. Directors could
not develop an understanding or appreciation of fiduciary duties to
shareholders because no one was ever held accountable for violating
them. 0 4 The chance of executives being held legally responsible was so
low that director and officer liability insurance did not exist.
20 5
Lack of accountability to shareholders at large, therefore, left them
subject to the dictates of the controlling shareholder. In case of a conflict,
directors and auditors had little incentive to defy the wishes of the
controlling shareholder and act on behalf of the interests of faceless and
silent non-controlling shareholders. Controlling shareholders, on the other
hand, made sure to reward loyal directors, executives, and statutory
auditors. After retirement, the controlling shareholders bestowed an array
of benefits on these retirees-hiring them as consultants, using them as
202 Daewoo did elect 25% of its board as outside directors in all of its affiliates starting
from 1998, even though this was not required before 1999. Tae-Ho Kwon, Kim-woo-
choong-hoe-jang (u) Daewoo-dong 3-got dae-pyo [Woo Choong Kim, Representative
Director of Daewoo Corp. and 3 Other Companies], HANKYOREH, Feb. 27, 1998. Listed
companies were first required to have at least one outside director on their boards beginning
in1998 and 25% of their boards starting from 1999. Korea Stock Exchange, Securities
Listing Regulations, art. 48-5 (amended Feb. 14, 1998); Kim, supra note 68, at 279 n.18.
203 Kim, supra note 68, at 281.
204 See Kon Sik Kim & Joongi Kim, Revamping Fiduciary Duties in Korea: Does Law
Matter in Corporate Governance?, in GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS:
CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN A NEW ERA OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS 373, 389
(2003).
205 Bernard S. Black et al., Shareholder Suits and Outside Director Liability: The Case of
Korea 26-27 (Stanford Law Sch. John M. Olin Program in Law and Econ., Working Paper
No. 298, 2005), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cftn?abstract-id=628223.
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suppliers, or giving them outsourcing contracts or transitional support.20 6
Having spent an average of twenty years of their lives to rise to senior
positions, these directors, executives, and statutory auditors had no
motivation to be "unfaithful" to the chairman, lose these benefits, and be
ostracized from one of their most important social circles.
The defense strategies of the former Daewoo executives in their
criminal trials revealed how they did not understand their duties or
responsibilities.2 °7 They argued that they merely followed Chairman Kim's
directions as obedient subordinates. They could not question his command,
particularly when they received direct instructions to commit accounting
frauds.2°8 Furthermore, they committed accounting violations for the
conglomerate, because companies had to repay recurring debts. They
suggested that their actions should thus be justified, because they did not
personally gain from the fraud or expropriate company funds.209 Under this
flawed reasoning, they perpetrated their financial crimes without guilty
consciences. Regardless of whether they personally benefited or whether
Kim was a dominating figure, they failed to appreciate their duty to prevent
the fraud. In the end, they allowed Daewoo to inflict "enormous damage
upon the Korean people and the national economy.' 210  Furthermore,
contrary to their belief, they did derive personal benefit because they would
"not lose the chairman's favor" and could "maintain their positions."'
The ability of Daewoo directors might have been affected more than
other conglomerates, because so many hailed from a particular school-
Kyunggi High School-which was considered Korea's elite secondary
school and required a separate entrance examination until 1973.212 As a
206 Kyung-Doo Kim, Han-beon im-won-eun yeong-won-han im-won? [Once an
Executive, Forever an Executive?], SEOUL SHINMUN, May 31, 2005, at 18; Young-Hae Choi,
Samsung "Han-beon im-won-eun yeong-won-han im-won" [Samsung, "Once an Executive,
Forever an Executive"], DONG-A ILBO, Apr. 25, 2005, at B7.
207 Fourteen executives were later found guilty for charges that revolved around
accounting fraud, loan fraud, foreign currency violations, and hiding assets overseas. See
infra Part IV.D.
20 2001 Gohab 171, at 8.
209 Contrary to other failed chaebols, investigations of Daewoo have not revealed that its
executives engaged in widespread personal misappropriation. The Public Fund Misconduct
Joint Oversight Team reported only one case of malfeasance involving an executive who
was indicted for using 950 million won ($791,700) in company funds to bribe government
officials and politicians to move the company's headquarters to a different city. PUBLIC
FUND MISCONDUCT JOINT OVERSIGHT TEAM, GONG-JEOK-JA-GEUM-BI-RI JUNG-GAN-SU-SA-
GYEOL-GWA [PUBLIC FUND MISCONDUCT INTERMEDIARY INVESTIGATION RESULTS] 3 (2002)
[hereinafter PUBLIC FUND MISCONDUCT RESULTS].
210 2001 Gohab 171, 132.
211 Id. at 53; 2001 No 2063, at 79; see infra Part JV.D.
212 Nam, supra note 180, at 25; Hou Yoon, Pang-pang-i 1-gi-neun dong-mun-hui-do mot-
na-gat-so-yo [First Generation of Students Who Entered Without an Examination Could Not
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Kyunggi graduate, Kim surrounded himself with an inordinate number of
its alumni. In Confucian Korea, high school ties constitute a powerful bond
that often forms the basis of a lifelong, vertical social relationship. Senior
alumni traditionally have considerable authority over junior alumni. The
old, schoolboy ties further consolidated the hierarchy in the upper echelons
of management and weakened checks and balances. Daewoo directors
themselves believed that school background was a much more important
factor in being chosen as a director compared to directors at other
chaebols.213 Furthermore, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Daewoo
underwent a generational change where many original executives who were
senior Kyongi graduates to Kim were replaced by more junior ones. 2 14 As
mentioned previously, the junior alumni that succeeded lacked the same
standing to counterweigh the legendary, domineering chairman.
C. Investor Passivity
Daewoo's shareholders could not have been more passive in
overseeing managerial decisions. 2 1 They did not raise questions, request
information, attend shareholders' meetings, engage in litigation, or meet
216with management. Curiously, foreign institutional investors with
considerable equity positions also remained complacent bystanders.
Despite their sophistication, they neglected governance-related action like
everyone else.2 7 They did not seek board representation, accountability, or
transparency, and failed to act as diligent monitors to curb fraudulent
activities. Many factors, such as legal restrictions and inherent apathy
problems contributed to the investor passivity. After the meltdown, the
restitution process has finally made shareholders more active participants.
One problem for Daewoo shareholders was that they could not easily
exercise their rights.218 Even after some of the most egregious corporate
Even Go to Alumni Meetings], NEWSMAKER, Oct. 30, 2007. Some claim that close to 90% of
senior Daewoo executives were Kyunggi and Seoul National University graduates. DAEWOO
SUICIDE, supra note 12, at 133-34; Sull et al., supra note 2, at 9 (stating that the average
percentage of Kyunggi graduates was 30% for senior Daewoo executives). According to the
author's determination, at the CEO level, approximately 50 to 60% were either Kyunggi
High School or Seoul National University graduates. Kim became the president of the
Kyunggi High School Alumni Association in 1998 as Daewoo's collapse was unfolding.
213 Dong-Seop Kim, Jae-gye-ui byeol: i-sa-deul-ui se-gye [The Stars of Business: The
World of Directors], WEEKLY CHOSUN, July 25, 1996, at 44.
214 For similar problems in the senior management, see supra Part III.A.
215 On shareholder passivity, see generally BERLE & MEANS, supra note 200.
216 Kim, supra note 68, at 278.
217 Id. at 278.
218 In fact, Korean policymakers deliberately weakened shareholder rights to induce
companies to list on the Korean Stock Exchange which was struggling to develop. For a
detailed discussion on the various limitations, see id. at 280-83.
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governance problems came to light, they did not exercise their legal rights
or take action. For example, when the presidential slush fund scandal
revealed in 1995 that 140 billion won ($155 million) of Daewoo's money
was used to bribe two former presidents, no legal actions-let alone
complaints-ensued.219 One problem was that the regulatory framework set
a prohibitively high minimum holding requirements for most shareholder
rights such as standing for derivative actions or inspection rights.22°
Without whistle-blowing by insiders or common law procedures such as
discovery, shareholders also lacked the means to obtain information needed
to question or challenge the management. Shareholders only brought civil
actions against directors and controlling shareholders when they could use
information obtained through regulatory actions or criminal prosecutions.
Shareholder representation through voting likewise faced many
restrictions. Institutional investors, for example, could only exercise their
votes through shadow-voting under which they had to split their voting
rights for agenda items, which effectively neutralized their participation.
Shareholders' meetings were also manipulated to deter shareholders from
raising issues. Companies colluded to hold annual general meetings on the
same day at the same time of the year to prevent active shareholders from
participating.222 Shareholders' meetings when convened lasted no more
than ten minutes and proceeded according to the scripts predetermined by
the company. Agenda items such as approval of accounting statements and
election of directors and auditors proceeded perfunctorily without
discussion.223
In this environment, investors, both domestic and foreign, behaved as
though monitoring costs were too high to have merit. Foreign investors
acted no differently even though they owned on average 9.5% of the top
five Daewoo companies that committed the largest amount of accounting
fraud.224  When coupled with traditional collective action problems, the
"Wall Street rule" of sell-and-move-on prevailed when companies reported
bad news or managers violated their duties or abused their powers. At the
219 Kim & Kim, supra note 71, at 567-68.
220 Kim, supra note 68, at 281.
221 Id.
222 In 2003, for example, 71.5% of the companies with accounting years ending in
December listed on the Korean Stock Exchange held their annual shareholders' meetings on
three particular days in March 2003. 2003 JU-JU-CHONG-HOE-IL-JEONG-HYEON-HWANG
[STATUS OF ANNUAL SHAREHOLDERS' MEETING DAYS], Korea Stock Exchange (on file with
author).
223 Kim, supra note 68, at 283-84.
224 In 1998, for example, foreigners owned 10.3% of Daewoo Corp., 1.7% of Daewoo
Motor, 7.8% of Daewoo Securities, 12.6% of Daewoo Electronics, and 14.9% of Daewoo




same time, equity investment, particularly on the retail side, proceeded on
an exceptionally short-term basis. Trading turnovers of Korean investors
remained considerably high. 2 5  A vicious cycle developed, because the
more short-term the ownership, the more economically impractical
monitoring became.226
Only after Daewoo's breakup have the investors-together with banks,
creditors, suppliers, and former employees-brought a host of legal actions
against Daewoo companies, managers, and accountants.227 In May 1999,
the Peoples Solidarity for Participatory Democracy ("PSPD"), Korea's
leading shareholder activist group, filed the first major civil action against
Woo Choong Kim and senior executives, claiming 24 billion won ($20
million) in damages.228 Apparently, over forty cases seeking a total of 600
billion won ($500 million) were pending in Korean courts against Daewoo
at one point.22 On September 12, 2002, shareholders even won their first
civil action arising out of claims related to Daewoo's accounting fraud
when Kim, former managers of Daewoo Electronics, its accounting firm
Anjin, and various accountants were held liable for 360 million won
($300,000) for releasing false audit reports.
230
During this process, shareholders have been assessed contributory fault
for their negligence. For example, in a 2005 case involving Daewoo
Electronics, the court found the investors partially at fault while allocating
different degrees of accountabilities between accountants and directors.
2h
225 Kim, supra note 68, at 283.
226 Korea's short-term trading might be high due to the lack of capital gains tax for small,
retail investors.
227 Until 2004, however, most of the Daewoo litigation was suspended due to a
constitutional challenge to the Constitutional Court regarding the false disclosure provision.
Judgment of Dec. 18, 2003, 2002 Heonga 23 (Constitutional Court).
228 The action followed on the heels of a June 1998 KFTC sanction against Daewoo for
improperly supporting its affiliates. After five years of litigation, the Seoul District Court
dismissed the claims against Kim that he should be responsible for the illegal support of
Daewoo Corp. on the grounds that he was not a director of the company involved and he did
not participate or tacitly agree to the support. Judgment of Nov. 18, 2004, 99 Gahap 47193
(Seoul Dist. Court), at 6-7, 31; Jae-Chul Lee, Kim-woo-choong-ssi Daewoo-gye-yeol-sa bu-
dang-ji-won chaek-im-eop-da [Woo Choong Kim Not Liable for Improper Support of
Daewoo Affiliates], SEOUL NEWS, Nov. 19, 2004. For a recent description of PSPD's
activities see Curtis Milhaupt, Nonprofit Organizations as Investor Protection: Economic
Theory and Evidence from East Asia, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 169 (2005).
229 Seok-Gi Min, Daewoo bun-sik-hoe-gye im-won bae-sang pan-gyeol: yu-sa-sa-geon
so-song it-tta-reul-deut [Compensation Decision Against Executives for Daewoo Accounting
Fraud: Similar Cases Should Follow], MAEIL Bus. NEWSPAPER, May 30, 2004, at 2.
230 Jung-Eun Lee, Bun-sik-hoe-gye pi-hae, Daewoo tu-ja-ja-deul seung-so-pan-gyeol
[Daewoo Investors Win Case for Losses from Accounting Fraud], DONG-A ILBO, Sept. 12,
2002; Judgment of Sept. 12, 2002, 2000 Gahap 78841 (Seoul Dist. Court).
231 2000 Gahap 78858, at 44-46. Three-hundred and sixty investors brought a separate
action on October 24, 2000 against the managers of Daewoo Electronics, Daewoo Heavy
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 28:273 (2008)
Of 14.5 billion won ($12.1 million) in liability for fraudulent audit
23reports, 32 shareholders were found contributorily negligent for 10%, while
accountants were held 30% liable, directors directly involved in the
accounting fraud, including Kim, 40%, whereas "non-financial" directors
and outside directors, only 20%.233 Previously in a 2004 case, shareholders
prevailed against Daewoo Heavy Industries executives, but had their claim
reduced due to contributory negligence as well.234 In this case, the court
found executives liable for 970 million won ($808,300) for falsifying
accounting records in the company's 1997 and 1998 annual reports that
investors relied upon, but capped their liability to 40% of the claim. 235 The
court found shareholders negligent in investing in such a risky stock of a
company that had widely known financial difficulties. 36 Therefore, while
shareholders have made strides in seeking restitutions, they have also been
reproached for their own failures.
D. Compliant Commercial Banks and Silent Debt-holders
Lenders and purchasers of debt also bear responsibility for their lack of
corporate governance oversight. They did not engage in governance-related
activities such as demanding transparent accounting, ensuring lending
discipline, or electing representatives to the borrower's boards.
Sophisticated foreign banks and debt holders similarly failed to utilize their
Industries, and their accountants for their accounting fraud, which settled in mediation on
January 2005. Chul-Yong Lee, Daewoo-jun-ja so-aek-ju-jujip-dan-so-song... 360-myoung
146-uk bae-sang-yo-gu [Daewoo Electronics' 360 Minority Shareholders Sued, Claiming for
14.6 Billion Won], DONG-A ILBO, Oct. 25, 2000, at 8.
232 Daewoo Electronics and its executives were found liable under Articles 186-5 and
Article 14 of the Securities Exchange Act (S. Korea) while the accountants were found liable
under Article 197 of the Securities Exchange Act (S. Korea) and Article 17, Paragraph 2 of
the External Audit Act (S. Korea).
233 2000 Gahap 78858, at 45-46. While reducing their relative liabilities, the court
rejected the defense of outside directors that they should not be assessed any responsibility
because they were non-standing board members and they fulfilled their "duty of due
diligence" by relying upon the external auditors. Id. at 23-24.
234 Ji-Bok Ryu, Daewoo bun-sik-hoe-gye ju-ga-son-sil bae-sang-chaek-im [Daewoo
Liable for Stock Losses from Accounting Fraud], YONHAP NEWS, May 30, 2004. Judgment
of May 28, 2004, 2000 Gahap 78865 (Seoul Dist. Court).
235 2000 Gahap 78865, at 9; Securities and Exchange Act, art.14, 1(S. Korea).
236 2000 Gahap 78865, at 17-18. Investors that purchased the company's stock after
October 1998, when serious accounting problems were widely reported in the media, were
excluded outright. Id. at 13. In two others cases, however, different district courts found
that liability should extend until November 11, 1999 when the government issued a formal
report. Sang-Hee Kim, Bun-sik-hoe-gye tu-ja-ja-son-sil sil-sa-gyeol-gwa bal-pyo-ttae-kka-ji
[Investor Losses Due to Accounting Fraud Until Announcement of Due Diligence], YONHAP
NEWS, Sept. 10, 2004; Yeong-Jae Moon, Daewoo-jeon-ja so-aek-ju-ju, bun-sik-hoe-gye son-
bae-so il-bu-seung-so [Daewoo Electronics Minority Shareholders Partially Win Accounting
Fraud Compensation Action], EDAILY, Jan. 13, 2005.
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lending position to access financial information and monitor board
decisions. Commercial stakeholders neglected these opportunities, and
instead suffered from a combination of a historical legacy of contentment,
over-reliance upon the government, dishonest practices, and their own
governance problems.
The ineffectiveness of domestic banks in corporate governance can be
explained by multiple factors. First, historically, the banks followed the
direction of policymakers who used administrative guidance to make sure
that chaebols received policy loans for government-led projects. Under
Korea's main bank system, each commercial bank acted as primary lender
of a particular chaebol.237 Financial crisis spread partially because banks
unquestioningly followed the policymakers' guidance and did not adhere to
adequate lending discipline over the chaebols even as their corporate debt
to equity ratios reached as high as 500%.238 Korea First Bank ("KFB"),
Daewoo's main bank and Korea's oldest bank, was at the center of the
storm during the Asian financial crisis. 239 KFB not only was a poor monitor
of Daewoo but also failed to detect its financial problems and did nothing to
stem its own credit problems. 240  KFB's own incapability should have
received more attention, because it served as the main bank for a string of
chaebols that went bankrupt right before the crisis.
241
Foreign commercial lenders differed little from domestic banks in their
242 dilax lending practices. They did nothing to ensure Daewoo's accounting
transparency or proper corporate governance. They also displayed the same
imprudence as domestic banks in mismanaging the risk exposure to
Daewoo.2 43 Unlike domestic banks, however, foreign commercial lenders
237 The system drew its origins from Japan. SUNG-HEE JWA, A NEW PARADIGM FOR
KOREA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 139 (2001). For a review of the Japanese banking
system, see Akihiro Kanaya & David Woo, The Japanese Banking Crisis of the 1990s:
Sources and Lessons (IMF Working Paper No. WP/00/7, 2000), available at http://www.imf
.org/extemal/pubs/ft/wp/2000/wpOO07.pdf.
238 JWA, supra note 237, at 28.
239 Daewoo's woes contributed to KFB collapse that led to a government takeover. See
Kim, supra note 68, at 320-22.
240 At one point, Daewoo even attempted to seek control of KFB. Lee, supra note 20, at
164. Largely to limit chaebol ownership, the banking laws did not allow an individual
investor to own more than 4% of a bank. Banking Act, Law No. 6691 of 2002, art. 2 (S.
Korea).
241 The failures of Kia Motor, Hanbo Group, Woosung Group, and Sammi Group in fact
sparked the spread of the Asian financial contagion to Korea. Hyung-Chan Jung & Myoung-
Chul Lee, Acquisition of Domestic Banks by Foreign Capital and Structural Changes in
Financial Industry. II J. MONEY & FIN. 101 (2006).
242 Interestingly, Japanese banks were not exposed to the Daewoo failure, having ended
their loans in February 1996. DAEWOO SUICIDE, supra note 12, at 154.
243 See generally Joongi Kim, The Next Stage of Reforms: Korean Corporate Governance
in the Post-Asian Financial Crisis Era, 1 ASIAN J. COMP. L 44, 49 (2006).
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could not blame administrative guidance, political pressure, or lack of
financial expertise for their questionable lending decisions. In making the
$5.1 billion foreign currency loans, foreign banks generally admitted that
they had lent to Daewoo because they believed the loans were backed by
"Korea Inc." 244 In the end, over 140 banks from 100 countries around the
world lent to Daewoo affiliates.245 Foreign banks cannot escape the
responsibility for failing to act as competent monitors. Given their
sophistication, they are just as culpable for their passivity, improper risk
assessment, and over-committing depositor money to high-risk Daewoo
loans.
Another problem facing domestic banks was their own ineffective
goverance.246 Selection of bank executives, for example, was a politically-
charged affair determined by a confluence of bureaucratic in-fighting, party
politics, and chaebol lobbying.247 Vulnerability to external pressure
compromised independence, and government's policy interests usually
prevailed. Hence, boards of these banks did not operate under the market-
oriented principles that focus on profits, shareholder value, and risk
assessment. The banks followed the too-big-to-fail myth and recklessly
extended credit under government directions. When financial crisis hit,
banks stood paralyzed without direction from the regulators. In the worst
cases, bank officers received commercial kickbacks from corporate
borrowers when granting loans not only on generous terms but also in
undeserving, high-risk situations.249  Furthermore, the banks themselves
operated under suspect accounting standards, particularly in their generous
treatment of non-performing loans.250
Finally, in the case of Daewoo, banks argued that they were deceived
by concealed accounting frauds. They claimed that they did not know the
seriousness of the financial situation due to the sophisticated international
244 Id. at 104. The loans were primarily made to Daewoo Corp., Daewoo Motor, Daewoo
Electronics, and Daewoo Heavy Industries. 1999 GOVERNMENT REPORT, supra note 49, at
17.
245 Let the Market Fix Daewoo, Bus. WK., Aug. 16, 1999, at 56. Another account
provided that 200 foreign credit banks were due $9.94 billion. DAEWOO SUICIDE, supra note
12, at 97. See also Chong-Tae Kim, Desperate Measures Might Be Too Little, Too Late,
Bus. KOREA, Aug. 1, 1999, at 14 ("Daewoo has US$7.7 billion in overseas debt, although
that has been reduced by US$1.8 billion since August 1998. Of the total, the group has
guaranteed the redemption of US$1.4 billion.").
246 Kyung Suh Park, Corporate Governance of Commercial Banks in Korea, in REFORMS
AND INNOVATIONS IN BANK MANAGEMENT 220-26 (Duk-Hoon Lee & Gill-Chin Lee eds.,
2004).
247 Id. at 220-23.
248 Hee-Sang Yoon, Dae-ma-bul-sa-sik-dae-chul an-doen-da [No Loan upon 'Too-Big-
To-Fail' Myth], DONG-A ILBO, Nov. 13, 1997, at 8.
249 Kim, supra note 68, at 320-22.
250 Park, supra note 246, at 220-23.
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machinations. For example, KFB's senior managers testified that they first
detected problems with Daewoo's balance sheet only in 1997."1
Nevertheless, commercial banks appear to have disregarded the warning
signs on Daewoo.252 As early as 1988, for example, commercial banks
charged Daewoo the highest rates among major conglomerates due to its
risks.253 One court found substantial contributory negligence against a bank
for a delinquent loan to Daewoo Motor.254 In this case, despite the
accounting fraud, the bank shared 80% of the fault while executives of
Daewoo Motor were held liable for only 6 billion won ($5 million) out of a
40 billion won ($33.3 million) loan. The court stressed that the bank knew
that "accounting fraud was rampant among Korean chaebols" and that they
"knew that Daewoo Motor's financial condition was not good. 2 55
As with shareholders, only after the meltdown did the banks and their
insurers finally become active in seeking accountability. First, they pursued
legal actions for repayment of delinquent loans made possible through
accounting fraud.2 56 In October 2004, for instance, Woori Bank won a 2
billion won ($2 million) judgment against senior executives of Daewoo
Electronics. Defendants were found liable for accounting
misrepresentations that led to 25.8 billion won ($ 25.8 million) in losses for
the bank.258 As mentioned above, in November 2004, Woori Bank also
251 In this criminal case, three Daewoo executives were convicted for defrauding KFB
into issuing a letter of credit for $150 million in 1994. The court sentenced the defendants to
prison terms ranging from two and one half years to three years. Ung-Seok Ko, 'Sin-yong-
jang sa-gi-dae-chul 'jeon Daewoo-im-won-deul sil-hyeong [Letter of Credit Lending Fraud:
Prison Term for Former Daewoo Executives], YONHAP NEWS, June 21, 2002; Judgment of
June 21, 2002 (Seoul Dist. Court) (unpublished); DAEWOO SUICIDE, supra note 12, at 21.
252 Kim & Bae, supra note 88, at 12.
253 Susan Chira, Daewoo Awaits AidMove, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1988, at D9.
254 Sang-Hee Kim, Daewoo-cha bun-sik-hoe-gye-dae-chul, Kim-woo-choong-ssi deung
60-eok bae-sang [Woo Choong Kim and Others Liable for 6 Billion Won ($5 Million) for
Accounting Fraud-related Loans to Daewoo Motor], YONHAP NEWS, Nov. 24, 2004;
Judgment of Nov. 24, 2004 (Seoul Dist. Court) (unpublished).
255 Kim, supra note 254 (quoting from the court's decision).
256 Article 401 of the Commercial Code (S. Korea) provided the basis for attributing
director liability to third parties such as the bank.
257 Judgment of Nov. 6, 2003, 2002 Gahap 82073 (Seoul Dist. Court). The Seoul High
Court upheld the liability and also held that the statute of limitations against executives and
accountants involved should be ten years and not three years as provided in the Civil Code
(S. Korea). Sang-Hee Kim, Bun-sik-hoe-gye dae-chul-pi-hae son-bae so-myeol-si-hyo lO-
nyeon [Ten Year Statute of Limitations for Compensation Claim for Loan Losses from
Accounting Fraud], YONHAP NEWS, Oct. 28, 2004; Yu-Jin Shin, I-sa-deul-i im-mu-reul ge-
eul-ri-han gyeol-gwa je-3-ja-ga son-hae bwat-da-myeon so-myeol-si-hyo-neun lO-nyeon
[Statute of Limitations Ten Years If Director's Neglect of Duties Causes Damage to Third
Party], LAW TIMES, Nov. 7, 2003.
258 The court allowed the case to proceed when it held that the statute of limitations for
case brought under Article 401 of the Commercial Code was ten years and not three years as
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won a 6 billion won ($5 million) judgment against five Daewoo Motor
executives including Woo Choong Kim. 59 Similarly, in July 2001, the
Korea Export Insurance Corporation ("KEIC") won a 250 billion won
($208 million) civil judgment against Woo Choong Kim for guarantees he
made on various bank loans to Daewoo.26 °
In addition to commercial banks, debt-holders such as investments
trusts, guaranty companies, merchant banks, and insurance companies
collectively neglected corporate governance of Daewoo despite acquiring or
guaranteeing 19.7 trillion won ($14.1 billion) of Daewoo debt in 1998 at
exorbitant interest rates.261 The investment trust industry held 18.6 trillion
won ($15.5 billion) in Daewoo debt, almost one-third of the conglomerate's
total debt.262 Merchant banks further held 2.9 trillion won ($2.4 billion),
life insurance companies 1.1 trillion won ($0.92 billion), and securities
companies 1.1 trillion won ($0.92 billion).263 Seoul Guaranty Insurance, for
instance, guaranteed a substantial amount of Daewoo's bond offerings and
was held responsible for over 7.2 trillion won ($6 billion), amounting to
12% of Daewoo's total debt.264  Three hundred and sixty eight foreign
institutions also owned at least $4.1 billion of Daewoo debt instruments.
provided under the Civil Code. The defense argued that statute of limitations would have
expired on November 2002, three years after the due diligence audit of Daewoo Electronics
in November 1992. This decision cleared the way for many other creditors in their actions
against Daewoo. The outside director, however, escaped liability because the court found
that he did not commit gross negligence after applying a different standard. Hyun-Gyu Shin,
Bun-sik-hoe-gye pi-hae son-bae-so si-hyo JO-nuen [JO-year Statute of Limitation for
Accounting Fraud Damages Suits], MAEIL Bus. NEWSPAPER, Oct. 28, 2004.
259 Kim, supra note 257.
260 KEIC's claim arose out of personal guarantees that it had secured from Kim for
insuring export financing loans to Daewoo Corp. and Daewoo Motor from several domestic
banks. When Daewoo defaulted on the bank loans, KEIC pursued legal action against Kim.
Se-Yong Park, Beop-won "Kim-woo-choong-ssi 2-cheon-500-eok gap-a-ra " [Court: "Woo
Choong Kim, Pay 250 Billion Won ($208 million)"], YONHAP NEWS, July 31, 2001;
Judgment of July 31, 2001 (Seoul Dist. Court) (unpublished).
261 Of this debt, 11.3 trillion won ($8.1 billion) consisted of corporate bonds and 8.4
trillion won ($6 billion) consisted of commercial papers, in addition to 8.4 trillion won ($5.6)
in bonds and 3.6 trillion won ($2.4) in commercial papers that already existed at the end of
1997. 1999 GOVERNMENT REPORT, supra note 49, at 2; Kim & Song, supra note 84, at 682-
83; Kim & Bae, supra note 88, at 11.
262 Commercial bank exposure was relatively larger when compared to investment trust
exposure. The government subsequently took over two of the largest investment trusts,
Korea Investment Trust and Daehan Investment Trust, who held most of the debt. 1999
GOVERNMENT REPORT, supra note 49, at 4.
263 Id.; Sam-sung-Kyo-bo-Dae-han-saeng-myeong Daewoo dae-chul sang-dae-jeok-eu-
ro keo [Samsung-Kyobo-Daehan Life's Loans to Daewoo Relatively Large], CHOSUN ILBO,
Sept. 13, 1999, at 14.
264 1999 GOVERNMENT REPORT, supra note 49, at 4.
265 PUB. FUNDS MGMT. COMM'N, PUBLIC FUNDS MANAGEMENT WHITE PAPER 157-59
(2004) [hereinafter PUBLIC FUNDS MANAGEMENT WHITE PAPER]. Through its legal mandate,
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Debt holders and guarantors, domestic and foreign, suffered devastating
financial losses, partially due to their own neglect. Despite their holdings,
these financial institutions did nothing in terms of Daewoo's corporate
governance. They passively acquired Daewoo debts in part as a reckless
attempt to increase their own profit margins and in part due to implicit
guarantees and pressure from the Korean government. 6 6 Daewoo bonds
and commercial papers had long been discounted at substantially higher
rates than other chaebols due to their risks.26 7 Many clung to the same
moral hazard that despite the risks the government would never let Daewoo
go under.268 Furthermore, in early 1999, regulators "threatened and pleaded
with" investment trusts to rollover Daewoo bonds that reached maturity.
Regulators resorted to arm-twisting because they believed they had to
prevent a dangerous run on Daewoo that could threaten the bond market.269
Daewoo's overwhelming debt compounded the government's inability to
respond decisively.
Since the financial crisis, banks, investment trusts and other debt
holders related to Daewoo have undergone extensive overhauls to improve
their performance, transparency, and independence. Many have been taken
over by multinational entities. Government intervention that compromised
independence of financial institutions has been curtailed. Many institutions
have finally begun to operate with rigor under market-oriented principles,
particularly regarding their business practices. 270 As with equity investors,
however, these foreign and domestic lenders and debt holders did not play a
role in corporate governance oversight while Daewoo headed toward a
debacle.27 1
KAMCO spent over 12.7 trillion won ($10.6 billion) to acquire 35.6 trillion won ($29.7
billion) of Daewoo's non-performing loans, of which over $4 billion consisted of non-
performing loans from foreign creditors. KOREA ASSET MGMT. CORP., NON-PERFORMING
LOAN RESTRUCTURING FUND WHITE PAPER 343-45 (2004).
266 DAEWOO SUICIDE, supra note 12, at 72.
267 KOH, supra note 48, at 1. The KDIC sued an executive of an investment trust for
violating his duty of care in purchasing high-risk Daewoo bonds. The court dismissed the
case, agreeing that he fulfilled his fiduciary duty by relying upon credit rating agency
reports. GYEONG-MUK IM, KOREA DEV. INST., CHAE-GWON-SI-JANG-E-SEO-UI SIN-YONG-
PYEONG-GA-GI-NEUNG GAE-SEON-EUL WI-HAN JEONG-CHAEK-BANG-HYANG [POLICY
SUGGESTIONS TO IMPROVE THE CREDIT ASSESSMENT FUNCTION IN THE BOND MARKET] 54
(2004).
268 Lee, supra note 20, at 165.
269 DAEWOO SUICIDE, supra note 12, at 73.
270 SANG-JO KIM, CHAEBOL-GWA GEUM-YUNG-EU JIN-JEONG-HAN GAE-HYEOK-EUL WI-HA-
YEO [FOR THE TRUE REFORM OF CHAEBOL AND FINANCE] 190-93 (2000).
271 Daehan Life Insurance, among others, later pursued legal actions to seek damages
from Daewoo executives stemming from the accounting fraud related to the debt, Baek-Gi
Kim, "Bun-sik-hoe-gye-ro son-hae ip-eot-da" Kim-woo-choong jeon Daewoo-hoe-jang
deung sang-dae Dae-han-saeng-myeong 28-eok son-bae-so-je-gi [Daehan Life 2.8 Billion
Won ($2.3 Million) Compensation Suit Against Woo Choong Kim Daewoo Chairman and
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E. Labor Limitations
As interested stakeholders, Daewoo's labor union and employees had
the incentive to function as active monitors. Yet, they did not operate as a
check to prevent wrongdoings by the senior management. An assortment of
factors ranging from board structure to weak ownership, lack of
information, and ineffective organization limited them from operating more
vigorously. It was only after the collapse that the labor representative took
action to bring Woo Choong Kim to justice.
First, despite Korea's civil law background that could trace its origins
to German law, formal labor participation on the boards of public
272companies never existed under Korean corporate law. Korea adhered to
a one-tiered board structure without codetermination. Labor union focused
on improving working environment, job stability, and wage increases.
Contentious management and labor relations did not translate into policy
discussion on securing board representation such as a two-tiered board.
In the case of Daewoo, due to its history of growth through acquisition, it
had the "highest possibility of labour [sic] conflict arising out of [its]
restructuring efforts" because laborers from the acquired company feared
prospects of downsizing. 274  Bitter, prolonged strikes plagued Daewoo
companies.275 The labor union, however, did not extract concessions
related to corporate governance that might have constrained abuses by the
controlling shareholder and executives.
Second, the labor union and employees were weak owners. As with
most Korean companies, Daewoo companies had employment stock
ownership plans ("ESOP") but they did not function as a monitoring
force.276 The average holding of ESOPs in Daewoo companies remained
Others for "Losses from Accounting Fraud"], LAW TIMES, Jan. 9, 2004.
272 Korea largely followed Japan's corporate law that also adopted a single-tier board
despite initially receiving a German transplant of corporate law. Katharina Pistor et al., The
Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 791,
849 (2002).
273 Kim, supra note 68, at 278.
274 SEOK YUN & MYEONG-JIN SHIN, CREDIT SUISSE FIRST BOSTON, KOREA's TOP TEN
CHAEBOLS: PART 130 (1998).
275 According to the Ministry of Labor, between 1995 and 1998, Daewoo had sixteen
labor strikes, second only to Hyundai. Id. at 31.
276 Korea started to adopt ESOPs in 1974, but ownership remained marginal. Capital
Markets Promotion Act, Law No. 2046 of 1968, art. 6 (repealed by Law No. 5254 of 1997)
(S. Korea). In 1958, before this law was even adopted, Yuhan Corporation became the first
company to issue ESOP-type shares to its employees as a means of improving the welfare of
employees and labor-management relations. In 2001, the legal framework for ESOPs was
overhauled. See Employees Welfare Fundamental Act, Law No. 6510 of 2001, arts. 27-42
(as amended Law No. 7159 of 2004) (S. Korea); Seong-Chan Park, Sin-u-ri-sa-ju-je-do-ui
ju-yo nae-yong-gwa hyang-hu gae-seon yeon-gu sa-hang [Central Aspects of the New ESOP
System and Future Research Issues Toward Its Improvement], 4 GOOD CORP. GOVERNANCE
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small and averaged only 0.61% at the end of 1997.277 ESOPs also remained
captive to company interests, with company insiders dominating their
operations.27 8 Moreover, under the regulatory structure governing ESOPs,
plan participants had to either delegate their voting rights to the head of the
ESOP or exercise the vote themselves. Collective action problems similar
to those of minority shareholders led plan participants to do neither.279 The
head of the ESOP would thus shadow-vote the shares of the plan. No
evidence could be found that Daewoo's ESOP operated any differently. In
the end, the value of Daewoo ESOPs plummeted, leaving thousands of
employees without their retirement savings.
Other factors affected the ability of the labor union and employees to
become more active monitors. They had limited access to information. As
witnessed through the operation of the BFC, for example, only a handful of
senior managers knew of the concealed accounts. Furthermore, under the
hierarchical decision-making structure, employees rarely challenged their
superiors. A strong culture of group loyalty prevailed. No one raised issues
or engaged in whistle-blowing. 280 Even after the dismantlement of the
conglomerate, former Daewoo employees have not written expos6s on what
led to the meltdown.2 8 '
IV. WHERE WERE THE GATEKEEPERS AND PUBLIC GUARDIANS?
As with all corporate scandals, a flurry of finger-pointing ensued as
everyone sought to pin the blame for Daewoo's meltdown. Ultimately, no
single entity can be faulted for the fiasco. Not only did the standard internal
corporate governance break down, but also a comprehensive breakdown
occurred at the external level. In particular, gatekeepers, both domestic and
foreign, did not fulfill their respective functions. Accounting firms,
credit rating agencies, securities analysts, and investment banks did not do
REV. 2 (2002).
277 Kim, supra note 78, at 24.
278 BEOM CHEOL CIN ET AL., MINISTRY OF LABOR, SIN-URI-SA-JU-JE-DO SIL-TAE-JO-SA-WA
OE-GUK-JE-Do BI-GYO-YEON-GU [A STUDY ON THE ACTUAL OPERATION OF ESOPs AND A
COMPARISON WITH FOREIGN SYSTEMS] 5 (2004).
279 Park, supra note 276.
280 Whistleblowers in the public sector began to receive legal protections only in January
2002. Craig P. Ehrlich & Dae Seob Kang, Independence and Corruption in Korea, 16
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 3 (2002).
281 One exception is Woo-Il Kim, the former Daewoo senior executive in charge of
restructuring of the entire group. Kim & Song, supra note 84, at 65 8-705. He also wrote a
semi-fictional account of the conglomerate: WOO-IL KiM, MuN-EO-NEUN WAE Ju-GEON-
NEUN-GA? [WHY DID THE OCTOPUS DIE?] (2005).
282 For general discussions on the role of gatekeepers in corporate governance, see
Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2.
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986); Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L.
REV. 916 (1998); Coffee, supra note 8.
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enough to prevent the mismanagement and fraud. In addition, public sector
guardians did not establish the legal discipline necessary for corporate
governance to operate effectively. Regulators, prosecutors, judges, and tax
authorities left corporate malfeasance uncorrected. Their failure to
discharge their public functions compounded the catastrophe.
What gatekeepers and guardians knew regarding Daewoo's dire
financial situation remains unclear. Given the enormity of the fraud it is
hard to believe that they did not have an inkling of problems. Courts have
reached conflicting conclusions. Some courts have held that financial
institutions and investment banks did not know the extent of troubles
because it was concealed by accounting frauds.283 According to these cases,
they would not have extended loans and would not have acquired or
guaranteed bonds had they known the extremity of the situation. Other
courts, however, reached contrary conclusions by finding sufficient
awareness among certain parties, particularly accountants, and allocated
contributory negligence.284
This Part assesses the roles of gatekeepers and guardians in the
Daewoo crisis. It specifically focuses on accounting firms, investment
banks, analysts, credit agencies, regulators, prosecutors, and the court
system. It surveys how they maintained a neglectful attitude toward
chaebols with regard to transparency and accountability. The Part
concludes with a discussion on the changes that have strengthened external
corporate governance. New enforcement mechanisms in particular have
developed outside of the existing legal framework.
A. Accounting Oversight: Chong-Un and San Tong
The external auditor's inability to provide proper auditing and
accounting contributed directly to Daewoo's financial scandal. This
occurred even though Daewoo's accountants were associated with global
accounting firms with stellar reputations. When Daewoo collapsed, local
firms bore the brunt of the blame while global partners conveniently
escaped scrutiny.28 5 Daewoo's accounting troubles were dismissed as
Korean problems that arose out of a combination of ineffective regulatory
283 2001 No 2063, at 37. The Supreme Court affirmed that banks and issuers did not
know the extent of the accounting fraud. 2002 Do 7262, at 6-10.
284 Kim, supra note 257.
285 Chong-Un served as the Korean affiliate of Horwath International, whereas San Tong
was long-associated with KPMG. John Burton, Partners Endorse Proposed Merger, FIN.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 2002, at 40 (stating that KPMG was only "indirectly affected by the 1999
collapse of Daewoo .... ). Initially, Daewoo sought to differentiate itself as a leader in
accounting transparency. In 1976, for instance, Daewoo became one of Korea's first
companies to follow international accounting standards when it hired Peat, Marwick &
Mitchell to start producing consolidated financial statements according to the U.S.
accounting standards. Aguilar & Cho, supra note 2, at 10.
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supervision, a lack of accountability, conflicts of interest, and weak self-
regulation. 286 In the aftermath, unprecedented liability helped to establish
compliance in the industry.
Daewoo's primary accounting firms, Chong-Un Accounting
Corporation ("Chong-Un") and San Tong Accounting Corporation ("San
Tong"), both leading accounting firms at the time, were associated with
Horwarth International and KPMG, respectively. Chong-Un served as
external auditor for Daewoo Precision, Kyungnam Metal, and Daewoo
Telecommunications.287 San Tong, Korea's second largest accounting firm
at one point, served as lead accountant for several major Daewoo
companies for over ten years.2 88 Market participants, domestic and foreign,
relied upon the global reputations of Horwarth and KPMG when doing
business with Daewoo. Horwarth and KPMG in turn extracted benefits for
lending their credibility. Yet, despite being aware of international auditing
and accounting standards, they did not adequately transplant these practices
into their local partners.
Although accounting firms claimed that they did not know of the
accounting fraud because of Daewoo's concealment, many other factors
contributed to their inability to function properly.289 First, tolerance for
accounting misstatements and opaqueness prevailed. Industrial policy of
the Korean government tacitly condoned inflation of financials under the
pretext that companies needed financing to grow. 290  Accounting firms
believed that Korean government would act as a safety net and resolve any
serious problems. At the same time, regulatory, civil, and criminal
accountability of the auditing industry remained practically non-existent.
Accounting firms were not held responsible to shareholders, creditors, or
other stakeholders at large due to weak private and public enforcement.291
Failure to comply with accounting or auditing standards such as omitting
important matters from audit reports or making false statements led to
criminal sanctions or civil liability in theory only.
From a practical standpoint, accounting firms believed they could not
286 Park, supra note 260.
287 Ahn Kwon Accounting Corporation ("Ahn Kwon") audited Daewoo Motor and Anjin
Accounting Corporation ("Anjin") audited Daewoo Electronics. AHN KwON, ANNUAL
REPORT 50 (2003).
288 San Tong served as the lead accountant for Daewoo Corp. in addition to Diners Club
Korea, Daewoo Heavy Industries, Daewoo Motor Sales, and Ssangyong Motor. At its peak,
San Tong had over 700 accountants. DAEWOO SUICIDE, supra note 12, at 270.
289 MYUNG-Su CHOI, DWI-JIP-EO-BO-NEUN GYEONG-JE HOE-GYE-BU-JEONG I-YA-GI
[ECONOMICS TURNED AROUND: ACCOUNTING MISSTATEMENT STORIES] 63-64 (1999).
290 Id. at 25. See supra Parts II.C & III.E.
291 Yeong-Bae Kim, Daewoo 23-jo-won, kko-ri jap-hin-da [Daewoo's 23 Trillion won
($19.2 Billion), Tail is Caught], HANKYOREH, July 26, 2000, at 21.
292 External Audit Act, art. 17 (S. Korea); Securities Exchange Act, art. 197 (S. Korea).
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afford to offend the chaebols, their dominant revenue-generating clients.293
A structural dependency developed, because firms relied on chaebol
business that pressured them into overlooking questionable accounting
294treatments. In August 1996, for example, a group of accountants from
San Tong apparently debated on whether to publicly expose Daewoo's
295 aohriaccounting problems. In another instance, San Tong was apparently
informed that issuance of over 15 trillion won ($16.7 billion) in commercial
paper was based upon false records.296 In both cases, business as usual
prevailed and nothing was done regarding the frauds. Finally, larger
accounting firms developed their own moral hazard because they presumed
that their stature made them so important they could not be allowed to fail.
After Daewoo's accounting fraud came to light, regulators sent
shockwaves throughout the industry when they suspended Chong-Un and
San Tong from receiving new businesses, which were the most severe
sanctions in history.297 Chong-Un received a one-month suspension of all
new businesses during March and April of 1999, while the FSS issued a
twelve-month suspension of new businesses against San Tong.298 In
addition, two San Tong accountants received the ultimate punishment when
their licenses were terminated. Prior to this, even after a string of
accounting scandals in 1997 involving Kia Motor, Asia Motor, and the
Hanbo Group-all companies audited by Chong-Un or San Tong-only
individual accountants were suspended and not the firms.2 99 The sanctions
served as death knells for the firms, which collapsed shortly thereafter.
293 San Tong, for example, generated over 15 billion won ($12.5 million) in annual
revenue from Daewoo companies. Mol-rak-han gong-ryong-gi-eop 'En-ron-Daewoo' eo-
tteon cha-i it-na [Failed Dinosaur Companies: Differences between Enron and Daewoo],
MAEIL Bus. NEWSPAPER, Jan. 25, 2002.
294 Kim, supra note 291.
295 DAEWOO SUICIDE, supra note 12, 145-52.
296 Daewoo executives suggested that San Tong should disclose that it did not discover
the fraudulent statements, but the firm allegedly did not heed the advice. Kim & Song,
supra note 84, at 682-83.
297 DAEWOO SUICIDE, supra note 12, at 158.
298 Press Release, Certified Public Accountant's Disciplinary Commission, Mar. 18,
1999. Bu-sil-gam-sa-han Chong-Un hoe-gye-beop-in 1 gae-wol eop-mu-jeong-ji
[Accounting Firm Chong-Un Receives a One-month Suspension for Delinquent Audit],
MAEIL Bus. NEWSPAPER, Feb. 12, 1999, at 2; Nam-Goo Jung, San Tong hoe-gye-beop-in 12
gae-wol yeong-eop-jeong-ji [Accouting Firm San Tong Receives 12-month Suspension],
HANKYOREH, Sept. 16, 2000, at 9.
299 The discipline provisions can be found at Certified Public Accountants Act, Law No.
1797 of 1966 art. 48 (as amended Law No. 7796 of 2005) (S. Korea); Implementing Decree,
Decree No. 18352 of 2004 (as amended Law No. 19958 of 2007) art. 30 (S. Korea). Aside
from paying their entire 1997 auditing fees from the respective companies into the
Compensation Fund, Chong-Un and San Tong were just restricted from auditing Kia Motor
and Asia Motor for three years. Chong-Un continued to serve as the primary external
auditor of various Daewoo companies for the 1998 accounting year. See infra Part IV.C.
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Meanwhile, KPMG and Horwarth avoided any censure while they quietly
terminated their relationships.
Accounting firms and accountants have subsequently faced a barrage
of legal claims that have helped to establish legal accountability in the
industry. 300  KDIC has taken the lead among claimants against the
accountants.3 °1 After announcing that thirty-five accountants from four
accounting firms collaborated with Daewoo executives to commit 2.81
trillion won ($2.34 billion) in accounting frauds, KDIC compelled banks to
bring civil actions to hold them responsible.30 2 Banks that received public
funds, such as Cho Hung Bank and Woori Bank, sued the accountants of
Daewoo Corp., Daewoo Heavy Industries, Daewoo Motor, and Daewoo
Telecom in November and December 2002.303 Similarly, KDIC's
subsidiary, the Resolution and Finance Corporation ("RFC"), directly
commenced civil litigation against San Tong and Ahn Kwon Accounting
Corporation ("Ahn Kwon") for their delinquent audits of Daewoo Corp. and
Daewoo Motor in September 2003.304
In the process, unlike commercial banks, courts have been more
willing to attribute knowledge of and liability for the accounting frauds to
the accountants. In one of the first criminal cases, a senior Chong-Un
accountant was held to be aware of the accounting fraud at Daewoo
Telecom. 305  The court found that the company and the accountant's
300 External Audit Act, art. 17 (S. Korea); Securities Exchange Act, art. 197 (S. Korea).
In one of the first civil cases ever brought by an investor against the accountants, the
Supreme Court held in September 1997 that Chong-Un liable for a delinquent audit of
Korea Steel Pipe, a company that collapsed, under the Securities Act and general tort law of
the Civil Code that has a ten-year statute of limitations. Judgment of Oct. 22, 1999, 97 Da
26555 (Supreme Court).
301 The firms implicated included Anjin, Ahn Kwon, and San Tong. Daewoo executives
were co-defendants in the actions. Daewoo Executives Cause W4.26 Tril. in Losses, KOREA
TIMES, Sept. 25, 2002; see infra Part IV.D.
302 Daewoo Executives Cause W4.26 Tril. in Losses, supra note 301; Depositor
Protection Act, Law No. 6173 of 2000 art. 21-2 (S. Korea).
303 Chi-Yeong Shin, Daewoo-bu-sil-gam-sa Son-bae-so it-tta-ra [Liability Suits Continue
for Daewoo's Delinquent Audits], DONG-A ILBO, Dec. 7, 2002, at 17. Cho Hung Bank
withdrew its case against Ahn Kwon related to Daewoo Motor on May 29, 2004. AHN
KWON, supra note 287, at 52. Woori Bank won a 2 billion won ($1.7 million) claim against
former Daewoo Electronics executives. Kim, supra note 257.
304 For more information on the purpose of the RFC, see What is the RFC?,
http://www.rfc.or.kr/eng/com/rfc-pri.php (last visited Mar. 8, 2008). Sang-Hee Kim, Kim-
woo-choong Daewoo-hoe-jang deung sang-dae 150-eok son-bae-so [15 billion won ($12.5
million) Compensation Action against Daewoo Chairman Woo Choong Kim and Others],
YONHAP NEWS, Sept. 15, 2003.
305 The Korea Development Bank apparently loaned 554.5 billion won ($396 million) to
Daewoo Telecom based upon fraudulent accounting records such as the 1998 Audit Report
Chong-Un had approved. The company engaged in 344.6 billion won ($231 million) of
accounting fraud in 1997 and 477.9 billion won ($341 million) in 1998. Judgment of Aug.
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collusive relationship indicated intimate awareness. 306  The accountant
received 470 million won ($392,000) in disgorgement penalties and an
eighteen-month sentence that was suspended for three years.30 7 In another
criminal action, the head of Ahn Kwon received a six-month sentence in
prison with a one-year suspension of execution and the firm received a
nominal fine of 20 million won ($16,700) for believing Daewoo Motor's
statements and not conducting a proper audit of the company.30 8 In civil
cases, courts also have assessed knowledge by the accountants of the
accounting frauds.30 9 In a judgment for Daewoo Electronics investors, for
example, one court held that accountants "discovered many facts that
indicated possible existence of wrongdoing and errors in the financial
statements."
3 10
Through the Daewoo saga, serious accountant and auditor liability has
been established for the first time. Enforcement discipline has had a
rippling effect because accounting firms finally had a strong disincentive
not to relent to corporate pressure to approve misrepresentations. They
could now point to the dire consequences of failing to comply with the law.
Leading foreign accounting firms, in the meantime, avoided any
controversy. The impression remains that all problems were purely local in
nature.
B. Investment Banks, Securities Analysts, and Credit Rating Agencies
Reputational intermediaries such as investment banks, analysts, and
credit agencies did not provide adequate scrutiny over Daewoo's decision-
making and accounting problems. The extent to which these experts knew
about Daewoo's financial situation, or refrained from knowing, similarly
30, 2001, 2001 No 1022 (Seoul High Court), at 6, 9, 11, affg Judgment of Apr. 12, 2001,
2001 Gohab 129 (Seoul Dist. Court); see also Seung-Jae Back, Bun-shik-hoe-gye joong-
hyeong [Accounting Window-Dressing Receives Heavy Sentence], CHOSUN ILBO, Apr. 13,
2001, at 31.
306 When Chong-Un was ordered to pay additional funds into the Monetary Liability
Compensation Fund for its delinquent auditing, at the accountant's request, Daewoo
Telecom apparently paid this charge on the firm's behalf because they were cooperative in
past audits. 2001 Gohab 129, at 6-7; 2001 No 1022, at 7-8.
307 2001 No 1022, at 6, 9, 11. In the lower court, the defendant had been sentenced to
two years. 2001 Gohab 129.
308 The weak accounting standards at the time, the accountant's lack of personal profit,
and the financial regulators' sanction of the accountants were considered mitigating
circumstances in the criminal sentencing. Sang-Hee Kim, Daewoo-cha bun-sik-hoe-gye bu-
sil-gam-sa, hoe-gye-beop-in jeon-dae-pyo-jip-yu [Former Accounting Firm Head Receives
Suspended Sentence for Daewoo Motor Accounting Fraud], YONHAP NEWS, Jan. 28, 2005.
309 The failure to correct the problems or disclose them violated Articles 6 and 8 of the
Accounting Auditing Standards. See ACCOUNTING AUDITING STANDARDS (Fin. Supervisory
Comm'n 1999) (S. Korea).
310 2000 Gahap 78858, at 34.
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lingers as a question. Investment banks underwrote enormous sums of
Daewoo securities throughout the financial crisis during 1997 and 1999.311
Industry securities analysts did not issue serious warnings about the
conglomerate until the middle of 1998.312 Credit agencies maintained
investment grade ratings until as late as May 1999. Gatekeepers associated
with the most prestigious firms all professed ignorance, claiming they were
blinded by Daewoo's financial wizardry. Unlike commercial banks or
accountants, legal actions seeking liability against these gatekeepers have
not taken place.
As early as 1988, Daewoo raised over $1 billion both in Korea and in
international capital markets such as the London-based Euromarkets.3 13
Daewoo continued to issue securities domestically and overseas during the
1990s through leading global underwriters. Furthermore, in 1998, during
the most critical period of the financial crisis, Daewoo successfully issued
19.7 trillion won ($14.1 billion) in corporate bonds and commercial paper at
interest rates ranging from 15% to as high as 25%. 3 14 Between July and
November of 1998, right before the collapse, Daewoo Motor alone issued
1.1 trillion won ($780 million) in bonds.3'
During the underwriting process, investment banks and securities
firms, domestic and foreign, were apparently oblivious to the problems.
During the criminal trials against Daewoo executives, courts applied a
higher burden of proof and agreed that financial institutions and investment
banks did not know the extent of the troubles.31 6 Courts held that
investment banks would not have acquired or guaranteed Daewoo bonds
had they known the extreme financial situation concealed by Daewoo's
accounting frauds.3 17 In general, under the generous standards of Korea's
securities law, underwriters could avoid liability as long as they could prove
311 Most of Daewoo Group's underwriting consisted of bonds and commercial paper.
1999 GOVERNMENT REPORT, supra note 49, at 2.
312 Regulators started to regulate analysts only after the crisis in May 2001. Press
Release, Fin. Supervisory Comm'n, Jeung-gwon-hoe-sa-ui yeong-eop-haeng-wi-jun-chik
[Securities Firm's Business Operation Regulations] (Dec. 27, 2002) (on file with author).
313 Chira, supra note 253.
314 See 1999 GOVERNMENT REPORT, supra note 49, at 2; Kim & Song, supra note 84, at
662; Kim & Bae, supra note 88, at 11.
315 2001 No 2063, supra note 139, at 83.
316 Id. at 37. The Supreme Court affirmed that issuers did not know the extent of the
accounting fraud. 2002 Do 7262, at 6-10. This generous standard contrasts sharply with the
recent multibillion dollar settlements involving underwriters of WorldCom bonds based
upon claims that underwriters improperly relied on the lead underwriter and failed to
conduct due diligence on their own. Gretchen Morgenson, WorldCom Teaches a Pricey
Lesson, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2005, at Cl; see generally Merritt B. Fox, Shelf Registration,
Integrated Disclosure and Underwriter Due Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L.
REV. 1005, 1015-25 (1984).
' 2002 Do 7262, at 6-10.
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that they engaged in "due diligence. 318 Due diligence could be established
through minimal effort by merely demonstrating reliance upon an
accounting firms' audit reports.319 Unlike in other countries, Korea has not
seen any legal actions against underwriters for failing to conduct proper due
diligence.
Some investment banks even helped the chaebol flout the laws by
improperly supporting the affiliates. In the case of bond offerings, for
example, securities firms affiliated with the conglomerate were restricted
from directly underwriting unsecured bonds from related affiliated
companies. Regulations existed to prevent securities firms from becoming
conduits to unduly support the affiliated companies within the same
conglomerate. To circumvent the restriction, a securities firm from one
conglomerate colluded together with another securities firm from another
conglomerate to underwrite bonds of affiliates from each other's
conglomerates in each other's names.320 Hence, bonds issued by Daewoo
affiliates would "circulate in the market" through a third-party purchase by
a securities firm of another conglomerate; that securities firm would then
sell the bonds back to Daewoo Securities.
321
Securities analysts did not function effectively either. The first official
concerns over the state of Daewoo were finally raised in June 1998 when
Credit Suisse First Boston ("CSFB") issued a comprehensive report
advising caution ("CSFB Report").322  This was seven months after the
financial crisis hit Korea. The CSFB Report highlighted that relative to the
other ten leading chaebols "Daewoo [stood] out as having extremely high
financing needs .... , 323  CSFB rated Daewoo's profitability among
,,324chaebols as one that "rank[ed] as one of the lowest .... It determined
that Daewoo had the highest net cross-guarantees at the end of 1997.325 In
particular, CSFB stated that it "continue[d] to be alarmed about Daewoo's
massive guarantees extended to its overseas affiliates. 326 CSFB assessed
that Daewoo was in the worst position in its ability to benefit from
327restructuring.
318 Securities Exchange Act, art. 14 (S. Korea).
319 Morgenson, supra note 316.
32o 2001 No 2063, at 40.
321 Id.
322 In March 1997, one highly-regarded analyst did comment on Woo Choong Kim with
foresight that "I don't know how he manages to finance all these projects, given that Daewoo
is always short on cash." Matthew Fletcher & Laxmi Nakarmi, Driving to the World,
ASIAWEEK, Mar 21, 1997.
323 YUN & SHIN, supra note 274, at 18.
32 4 Id. at 21.
325 Id. at 26.
326 Id. at 27.
327 Id. at 40.
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Then in October 1998, Nomura issued a report titled, "Alarm Bells
Ringing for Daewoo Group" ("Nomura Report").328 In essence, the
Nomura Report declared that the "king was not wearing any clothes."
Nomura compiled the report in response to the Financial Supervisory
Commission's ("FSC") decision to impose a limit on the amount of
corporate bonds financial institutions could hold. Nomura foresaw that
Daewoo would have difficulty withstanding its credit crunch because of its
over-reliance on corporate bonds and short-term debts, low market
capitalization, and lack of attractive assets. The Nomura Report stated that
during the financial crisis Daewoo "survived solely on liquidity procured
through bond issuances.,, 329 Nomura even anticipated that Daewoo would
ultimately threaten local banks with its "unique logic of too big to fail" and
that overseas creditors would not be persuaded by it.330 Nomura went so far
as to terminate its coverage of Daewoo Electronics and Daewoo Heavy
Industries.331 One can speculate that it took securities analysts so long to
issue warnings because their firms did not want to jeopardize Daewoo's
investment banking business.
Among the reputational intermediaries, credit rating agencies were
perhaps the slowest to assess the precarious state of Daewoo's affairs.332
They were criticized for reacting to unfolding events instead of acting as
warning systems that should have led the market.3 33 In particular, leading
328 Although Daewoo's risk was noted in Nomura's June 1998 report, Hanwha and Dong
Ah Construction were deemed the main restructuring concerns and not Daewoo; because of
this, a "hold" and not "sell" recommendation remained for Daewoo Heavy Industries. KOH,
supra note 1, at 1-2.
329 Koh, supra note 48, at 2.
330 Id. at 3.
131 Id. at 2.
332 Simon Davies & Edward Luce, Credit Rating Agencies Under Fire on Korea, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 12, 1997, at 30; Rating Agencies: Risks Beyond Measure, ECONOMIST, Dec. 13,
1997, at 68. Domestically, the three major credit rating agencies, Korea Investors Service
("KIS"), Korea Ratings, and National Information & Credit Evaluation ("NICE") were
established in the late 1980s. In 1990, Standard & Poor's began its coverage of Korean
companies issuing bonds overseas and established a local office in August 2000. NICE
signed a strategic alliance with Japan's Rating and Investment Information in April 2000.
Jun-Dong Park, Han-guk-sin-yong-jung-bo, il sin-yong-pyong-ga-gi-kwan R&I-wa-jun-ryak-
jae-hwu [NICE, Strategic Cooperation with R&I, a Japanese Credit Rating Institution],
HANKYUNG, Apr. 26, 2000, at 1.
333 Rating Agencies, supra note 332, at 68. See also Guillermo Larrain et al., Emerging
Market Risk and Sovereign Credit Ratings 7 (OECD Dev. Centre, Working Paper No. 124,
1997) (discussing credit rating agencies' performance during Mexico's economic crisis in
1994-95), available at http://lysander.sourceoecd.org /vl=31497774/cl = 15/nw = 1/rpsv/cgi-
bin/wppdffile=51gsjhvj7ctc.pdf; Who Rates the Raters?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 26, 2005, at 67
("[H]ow could S&P, Moody's and Fitch have been so oblivious to Asia's gathering financial
problems in the mid-1990s (only to catch up with repeated downgrades once the problems
were widely known)?").
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domestic and foreign credit rating agencies did not downgrade Korea's
sovereign ratings or the credit ratings of Daewoo and other chaebols in a
timely fashion. In general, however, credit ratings agencies have avoided
responsibility and have not faced any significant legal scrutiny for their
failures.3 34
Domestic credit rating agencies maintained investment grade ratings
for most Daewoo affiliates throughout 1998 and well into 1999. They
remained unaffected by warnings issued in the June 1998 CSFB Report and
the November 1998 Nomura Report. Only in January and February 1999
did the agencies downgrade local currency credit ratings on Daewoo
company bonds such as those of Daewoo Corp., Daewoo Motors, Daewoo
Electronics, Daewoo Heavy Industries, Daewoo Securities, and Daewoo
Capital from A- to BBB- rating. Ratings dropped from an investment grade
of BBB- to speculative grades of BB or BB+ six months later in May and
June 1999. 33P Furthermore, during this time, Korea Investors Service
("KIS") entered into a joint venture with Moody's in August 1998, and
Korea Ratings began a business alliance with Fitch in January 1999.
International firms provided their reputations to local institutions but did
not improve their credit assessment capability in time.
Foreign credit rating agencies only proved marginally more rigorous,
although they did not distinguish between Daewoo and other chaebols in
terms of foreign currency ratings of bonds issued abroad. Before the crisis
occurred, Daewoo Corp. and most other chaebol companies maintained the
same investment grade credit ratings of BAA2 from Moody's and BBB-
from Standard & Poor's. 336 Foreign currency bonds generally received
lower credit ratings due to foreign exchange risk and transaction costs.
Then on December 22, 1997, as the financial contagion spread, the agencies
simultaneously downgraded sovereign ratings of emerging markets such as
Indonesia, Malaysia, Russia, and Korea.3 37 The Korean downgrades were
the "most dramatic instances of sovereign rating downgrades in the history
of sovereign ratings, bar none. 3 38  Downgrades of the chaebol
corresponded with sovereign rating downgrades. Ratings for major
chaebols plunged together two grades each on two consecutive days,
334 IM, supra note 267, at 53.
... 2000 Gahap 78858, at 15; PUBLIC FUNDS MANAGEMENT WHITE PAPER, supra note
265, at 210.
336 Moody's Investors Service, Rating Action: Moody's Assigns Baa2 to Daewoo
Grantor Trust (Aug. 11, 1997), available at http://www.moodys.com/moodys
/cust/upgrade-your service.aspx?reqURL=/moodys/cust/research/mdcdocs/09/20003000003
15500.asp&docid=2000300000315500 (registration required to download).
337 Emerging Market Debt Sharply Lower on Asian Woes, REUTERS NEWS, Dec. 22, 1997.
338 Christopher Huhne, After Asia: Some Lessons of the Crisis, FITCH IBCA SOVEREIGN
COMMENT, Jan. 13, 1998, at 2 (on file with author).
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resulting in a total drop of four grades from BBB- to B+. 33 9 Daewoo was
treated no differently.3 ° Only after seven months in July 1998, did Daewoo
and Hyundai companies receive additional downgrades from B+ to B.
Another eight months passed before Standard & Poor's finally downgraded
Daewoo Corp. from B to B- in April 1999. By July 1999, Standard &
Poor's and Fitch IBCA downgraded Daewoo Corp. from B- to CCC rating,
which indicated that default was a possibility.
3 4 1
This suggests that both domestic and foreign credit rating agencies did
not serve as effective gatekeepers in detecting Daewoo's problems. They
followed a herd mentality by moving together and reacting belatedly. Their
inability to assess the creditworthiness of Daewoo and its affiliates in a
timely fashion helped lull investors and creditors into a false sense of
security. Several factors limited their effectiveness. First, until the
financial crisis, most corporate debt of Daewoo consisted of secured bonds
and not unsecured debentures. This reduced the need for an active market
for credit assessment of bonds. Furthermore, the credit rating agencies
faced conflicts of interest when rating corporate bonds.342 Commercial
banks were not only the primary shareholders of credit rating agencies but
also owned and guaranteed a substantial amount of the bonds. Negative
ratings by an agency could have had a direct impact upon the value of the
bank's bond holdings.
C. FSS, KFTC, and KDIC
In the aftermath of the scandal, Korean policy makers and regulators
bore the brunt of condemnation because regulatory oversight malfunctioned
and a state of paralyzed indecision followed.34  Government regulators
were the "only actor[s] who could have stopped the Daewoo collapse or at
least minimized the cost by intervening swiftly... ," but they did not take
339 Jae-Yong Lee, Han-guk-sin-yong-kkeut-up-neun-chu-rak/mi-S&P-junk-bond-su-jun
pyoung-ga-jeol-ha [Korean Credit Falling Endlessly/U.S. S&P Downgrade to Junk Bond
Status], DONG-A ILBO, Dec. 24, 1997, at 2.
340 The only distinction was that Daewoo Corp. was initially downgraded three places on
December 22, 1997, most likely as a result of its inopportune purchase of Ssangyong Motor.
Daewoo Corp. joined the downgrade to a B+ rating with other Korean corporations the next
day. Han-guk-dae-gi-up sin-yong-deung-geup a-gik- junkbond 'yu-ji/S&P-sa [Korean Large
Corporattions Maintain 'Junk bond' Credit Rating/S&P], MUNHWA ILBO, Feb. 20, 1998, at
3.
341 Fitch IBCA also removed Daewoo Corp. from its "RatingAlert positive" list. Daewoo
had been on the list since February 1998. Fitch IBCA Downgrades Daewoo Corp's Rating,
ASIA PULSE, July 21, 1999; Lee, supra note 20, at 168.
342 IM, supra note 267, 46-49.
343 Repeated freedom of information ("FOI") requests with the FSS for regulatory audits
of Daewoo have been denied. These FOI requests are on file with author.
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initiative, particularly throughout the critical time of 1998.344 Together with
the policy makers, the regulators suffered from a combination of
disincentives for seeking active solutions, overconfidence as the architects
of Korea's economic success, and fear of the unknown if they allowed a
major chaebol to fail. 345 Lack of regulatory discipline in particular nurtured
lax compliance that fostered the mismanagement and fraud. Although not a
traditional regulator, the KDIC has emerged as one of the most effective
public sector sources of corporate governance discipline following the
Daewoo crisis. It has helped generate an enforcement mechanism that
operates outside of the statutory corporate law framework and served to
establish accountability.346
Over the years, warning signs existed for regulators to ascertain the
magnitude of Daewoo's troubles. Starting from 1986, for example, the
Korea Bankers Association operated a consolidated financial information
system. Any regulator or person with access to the system could determine
that Daewoo Group's loans from banks amounted to approximately 8
trillion won ($8.9 billion), but that its financial statements stated its
borrowing as only 5 trillion won ($5.6 billion).347 Once again, signs of the
conglomerate's problems could have been detected in the mid- 1990s.1 4' To
obtain financing from foreign markets, Daewoo had been among the first
chaebols to provide consolidated financial statements in the mid-1970s, but
it suddenly stopped providing them in the mid-1990s. 349 Later, other than
financial restrictions on its debt, blunt warnings from CSFB and Nomura in
1998 did little to spur further regulatory action. Government did
"practically nothing until October 1998 to force Daewoo to reform., 350 As
late as November 1998, instead of a warning to protect the unwary, the
Minister of Finance and Economy even issued a statement to allay fears
over the Nomura report that "there [was] no liquidity crisis in relation to the
Daewoo Group., 351 The government began direct restructuring efforts only
344 Lee, supra note 20, at 172.
341 Id. at 173-74.
346 The KDIC's informal role as an enforcement agency can be viewed as an example of
the functional convergence taking place in countries with an inefficient legal governance
system. See generally Coffee, supra note 10, at 679-82.
347 Kim & Song, supra note 84, at 681.
348 DAEWOO SUICIDE, supra note 12, at 155.
349 Starting in March 1995, Daewoo's senior management actually begun to receive
secret quarterly reports on Daewoo's "special borrowing (F-Nego)" that was conducted
through false export documents. 2001 Gohab 171, at 22-23.
350 Lee, supra note 20, at 167. The government did curtail bond and commercial paper
issuances. See supra Part II.D.
351 Lee-kyu-seong jae-kyeong-bu-jang-kwan Daewoo yu-dong-seong uei-gui-up-da
[Minister of Finance and Economy Kyu-Seong Lee Says No Liquiditiy Crisis for Daewoo],




Financial regulators such as the FSS in particular failed to establish
legal compliance in the accounting profession. In theory, accounting firms
were subject to numerous criminal, civil, and regulatory sanctions. For
example, they could be subject to three years of imprisonment or a 30
million won ($25,000) fine for making omissions or false statements in an
audit report.353 Aggravated punishment provisions extended prison terms to
a minimum of three years if monetary gains from an accounting fraud
exceeded 500 million won ($41 7,000). 3  Accountants and their firms
could have their licenses suspended or terminated.3 55 Accountants also had
to report wrongdoings or any important facts that indicated violation of
laws or their firms' articles of incorporation.356  Enforcement, however,
seldom occurred for non-compliance. Light monetary fines or sanctions
were issued even after repeated involvements in accounting frauds.
357
352 Lee, supra note 20, at 168.
353 External Audit Act, art. 20, 2 (S. Korea). From 1989 to 1998, the punishment was
up to two years of imprisonment or a million won ($833) fine. In 2003, a new provision was
added that required up to five years of imprisonment or a 30 million won ($25,000) fine if an
accounting firm deliberately falsifies, alters, damages, or destroys audit work-paper made in
preparation for an audit report. Id. (as amended Law No. 6991 of 2003). In 2003, the
Securities Exchange Act was amended to punish accountants for falsely recording important
facts in the required disclosure documents, annual reports, semiannual reports, or quarterly
reports with up to five years of imprisonment or a 30 million won ($25,000) fine. Securities
Exchange Act, art. 207-3. (as amended Law No. 7025 of 2003). For non-listed stock
companies, the Commercial Code provides that a person who improperly records or
negligently reports accounting statements would be subject to a penalty of only up to 5
million won ($4,120). Commercial Code, art. 635, 1, no. 9 (S. Korea). Although now
repealed, from 2001 until 2003, the Corporate Reorganization Promotion Act provided that if
a company does not properly operate an internal accounting system or if one forges, alters,
or damages accounting records, then it would be subject to up to five years of imprisonment
or a thirty million won ($25,000) fine. Corporate Reorganization Promotion Act, art. 37 (as
amended Law No. 6991 of 2003) (S. Korea).
354 Aggravated Punishment Act, art. 3 (S. Korea). Gains of over 5 billion won ($4.17
million) call for a minimum imprisonment of five years. Id.
355 See supra Part IV.A.
356 External Audit Act, art. 10 (S. Korea). No application of this provision has been
found.
357 For example, in Hanbo Steel's 6.6 trillion won ($4.7 billion) accounting fraud in
1997, its auditor Chong-Un received minimal sanctions. When Kia Motor and Asia Motors
collapsed shortly thereafter, their auditors Chong-Un and San Tong, again received minor
sanctions even though they have failed to discover over 3.3 trillion won ($2.36 billion) and
1.56 trillion won ($1.12 billion) of accounting frauds, respectively, committed over a seven-
year period starting from 1991. The Securities Supervisory Service ("SSS") restricted
Chong-Un and San Tong from auditing only Kia Motor and Asia Motors for three years and
just required them to pay their entire 1997 auditing fees from those companies to the
Liability Compensation Fund. Three accountants from Chong-Un and San Tong were
suspended for six to nine months, but not the firms themselves. The SSS also restricted
Chong-Un from being a designated auditor for one year for the five leading companies that
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Coupled with the lure of business and intense competition, weak
enforcement left accountants exposed to the client companies' demands for
aggressive accounting with only their own sense of ethics to constrain them.
When grave signs of Daewoo's accounting troubles surfaced in 1997,
financial regulators did not respond. In May 1997, as part of its General
Audit Review of listed companies, for example, the Securities Supervisory
Service ("SSS") found that the 1996 annual reports of Daewoo Corp. and
Daewoo Precision Industries, Ltd. underreported substantial amounts of
assets and liabilities.358  Furthermore, during the review, regulators
discovered over 299 billion won ($322 million) in off-balance sheet
liabilities of Daewoo Corp.359 Nothing happened other than a request for
correction. 360 The SSS's General Audit Review the next year in May 1998
discovered that Daewoo Telecom did not record 261 billion won ($186
million) of liabilities on its accounting books. As in the past, only minor
corrective action followed. 361  Finally, no reaction followed when a
whistleblower allegedly told the senior regulators in early 1999 that
Daewoo companies had engaged in an accounting fraud of over 30 trillion
won ($25 billion).362 Thus, red flags about Daewoo's accounting problems
were repeatedly disregarded.
In contrast, the KFTC served as one of the more active regulators of
the regulator designated. Hee-Chun Cho, Kia-jeok-ja 4-jo 5,738 eok-i-na jul-yeo bal-pyo
[Announcement of Kia's Deficit Reduced Figures by 4.5738 Trillion Won ($3.27 Billion)],
CHOSUN ILBo, Dec. 24, 1998, at 34; Jin-Gun Chung & Hun-Soo Kim, Hwan-ran-ju-beom
Kia hanbo gam-sa-in-e myeon-je-bu [Pardon for Auditors Kia and Hanbo 's, the Principal
Offenders in the Foreign Currency Crisis], MAEIL Bus. NEWSPAPER, Dec. 24, 1998, at 17;
Soonbin Park, KiaAsia-cha 4-jo 8 cheon-eok bun-sik [Kia-Asia Motor 4.8 Trillion Won
($3.43 Billion) ofAccounting Fraud], HANKYOREH, Dec. 24, 1998, at 10.
358 While done on a random rotating basis, this was the first general audit of a Daewoo
affiliate in three years. Fifty-seven other companies were included as part of this annual
general audit. DAEWOO SUICIDE, supra note 12, at 192.
9 Id. at 193.
360 The SSS later tried to marginalize the results of the audit review by claiming that it
represented the efforts of one regulator working for six weeks. Yet, if that was the case, then
many more wrongdoings may have been unearthed if the SSS had devoted additional
resources to the review. Id. at 187-88.
361 Gyu-Jae Jeong et al., Daewoo pae-mang bi-sa (21) bun-sik tto bun-sik [Daewoo
Failure Secret History (21) Accounting Fraud, More Accounting Fraud], HANKYUNG, Sept.
27, 2001.
362 DAEWOO SUICIDE, supra note 12, at 184-95. The FSS issued a press release denying
such a meeting. Press Release, FSS, Han-kuk-kyung-jae-ue keum-kam-ue, Daewoo-bun-
shik 30-jo al-go-do muk-sal jae-ha-ue gih-sa mit kim-woo-il-ssi in-tuh-vu-nae-yong-ue dae-
han hae-myung [Response to Woo-Il Kim's Interview and Hankyung's Article Alleging that






chaebols. Starting in July 1992, the KFTC began to regulate improper
support among affiliates of the largest chaebols.3 3 The KFTC gained the
new authority to require companies to terminate such support, force them to
publish notices of their wrongdoing, and issue fines up to 2% of sales from
the prior year.36  In serious cases, the KFTC could refer persons or
companies for criminal prosecution, who could then face up to two years of
imprisonment or 150 million won ($125,000) in fines.365 While the KFTC
foresaw the dangers in the weak corporate governance of chaebols, it could
not generate the political mandate to effectively monitor them. The KFTC
conducted its first real investigation in 1993, but the investigation ended
without much consequence. In the end, the KFTC proved unable to curb
unreasonable support of subsidiaries before the crisis.
In 1998, the KFTC launched two full-scale investigations against
leading chaebols including Daewoo. The investigations focused on
unreasonable financial and personnel support, instead of just traditional
goods and services.366 The KFTC discovered substantial, improper affiliate
subsidization, even though companies had been warned that the
investigations were pending. 367 In the case of Daewoo, it found that six
companies improperly supported seven affiliates for a total of 461 billion
won ($329 million). For example, Daewoo Corp. and Daewoo Heavy
Industries provided financial support to affiliates on non-market terms by
refraining from collecting account receivables, providing interest-free loans
for employees that purchased Daewoo Motor cars, or purchasing bonds,
363 Jae-bol-gye-eol-sa-gan-geu-rae kyu-jae [Regulating Chaebol Affiliates' Intra-
transactions], HANKOOK ILBO, July 7, 1992, at 6. The KFTC focused on the provision and
outsourcing of goods and services at discounts or premiums among chaebol affiliates, often
through transfer pricing schemes. Such provision and outsourcing were viewed as "unfair
trade acts" under which chaebol discriminated against other independent companies in favor
of their affiliates. KOREAN FAIR TRADE COMM'N, DAE-GYU-MO-GI-EOP-JIP-DAN-U BUL-
GONG-JEONG-GEO-RAE-HAENG-WI-E DAE-HAN SIM-SA-GI-JJN [EVALUATION STANDARD FOR
LARGE CONGLOMERATE GROUP'S UNFAIR TRADE ACTS] 4-5 (1992), available at http://ftc.go
.kr/data/law/new/19920701 .hwp.
364 Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, Law No. 7315 of 2004, art. 24-2 (S.
Korea). The possible surcharge was raised from 2% to 5% in December 1999. Id. (as
amended Law No. 6043 of 1999).
365 Id. arts. 67, 2 & 70. In 2000, the KFTC for the first time referred a company for
criminal prosecution. As of April 2000, the top chaebols must get an approval by the board
of directors for internal transaction above a certain amount. Id. art. 11-2.
366 This was based upon a significant revision of the fair trade law in December 1996,
just before the financial crisis. Id. art. 23, 1, no. 7; see KOREAN FAIR TRADE COMM'N, BU-
DANG-HAN JI-WON-HAENG-WI-UI SIM-SA-JI-CHIM 7-HO [REVIEw GUIDELINES FOR IMPROPER
SUPPORT ACTS No. 7] (1997). Daewoo underwent four investigations from 1998 to 2001 and
received three separate fines.
367 KOREAN FAIR TRADE COMM'N, JE-23-JO JE-I-HANG JE-7-HO-E WI-BAN-DOE-NEUN BU-
DANG-JI-WON-HAENG-WI [IMPROPER SUPPORT ACTS THAT CONTRAVENE ARTICLE 23,
PARAGRAPH 1, No. 7], available at http://ftc.go.kr/data/law/new/16/200210110001.hwp.
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commercial paper, or foreign exchange under unfavorable conditions. 368 Of
course, the accounting fraud most likely understated the actual scope of
improper support.36 9 In the end, the KFTC fined Daewoo a comparatively
modest 13.3 billion won ($9.5 million).37 °
Therefore, regulators squandered oportunities to prevent the crisis.
They took action only after the collapse. Daewoo's breakdown led to an
exhaustive audit of twelve major companies and discipline for those
involved.372 The Securities and Futures Commission ("SFC") referred five
Daewoo companies and twenty one executives who had committed more
than 500 billion won ($417 million) in accounting frauds and also four
partner-level accountants that had audited the companies for criminal
368 Seung-Yoon Park, Gong-jung-wi, gye-jyoa-chu-juk-kwon chut-hwal-yong [Fair Trade
Commission, Bank Account Search Investigation Done for the First Time], MUNHWA ILBO,
May. 4, 1999, available at http://www.munhwa.com/news/view.html?no = 19990504100016
01.
369 Daewoo requested re-examinations of three investigations but they were all dismissed.
In the October 2001 investigation, the KFTC announced how Daewoo used sham affiliates
posed as unrelated companies. By dressing themselves as independent unaffiliated
companies, sham companies were utilized to avoid KFTC regulations. After a three-week
search based upon stock ownership and management control, the KFTC found six sham
companies that belonged to the Daewoo Group. Woo Choong Kim controlled these
companies through stock owned through Daewoo Corp., other senior managers, dual
appointments of directors, and excessive trading and lending. Press Release, Korean Fair
Trade Comm'n, Gu dae-gyu-mo-gi-eop-jip-dan 'Daewoo' mit 'Daewoo Corp.' ui wi-jang-
gye-yeol-hoe-sa jo-sa-gyeol-gwa [Result of the Investigation of Former Large Company
Group 'Daewoo' and 'Daewoo Corp.'s' Sham Affiliated Companies] (Jan. 25, 2002) (on file
with author). Ultimately, the KFTC referred the case for prosecution and in Kim's criminal
trial the court found him guilty for omitting data on 16 sham companies. 2005 Gohab 588,
at 56-57.
370 After its fall, a third investigation was held in 1999 that found that Daewoo provided
85.8 billion won ($71.5 million) in unreasonable support to its affiliates, second only to
Hyundai. Daewoo received a relatively heavier fine of 13.5 billion won ($11.25 million) for
this violation. Finally, the KFTC conducted a fourth investigation in October 2001 upon
which a fine of 677 million won ($564,200) was levied against three related companies.
Daewoo Corp. was excluded because it was undergoing dissolution. Press Release, Korean
Fair Trade Comm'n, Daewoo Construction deung 4 gae-sa-ui bu-dang-nae-bu-geo-rae jo-sa-
gyeol-gwa [Result of the Investigation on Improper Internal Transactions of Daewoo
Construction and 3 Other Affiliated Companies] (Dec. 29, 2001) (on file with author).
371 Surprisingly, no tax evasion charges have been brought by the tax authorities or
prosecutors. One ironic twist has been that Seoul Administrative Court has recently held
that the tax authorities must refund excess taxes that were paid as a result of inflated
accounting figures. Daewoo Electronics apparently has a similar case pending. I-Seok Oh,
Bun-sik-hoe-gye-ro deo naen beop-in-se, dol-ryeo-bat-eul su it-da [Excess Corporate Tax
Paid Through Accounting Fraud Can Be Reclaimed], LAW TIMEs, Aug. 27, 2004.
372 Starting from December 1999 and lasting until August 2000, the Daewoo Special
Audit Team established at the FSS conducted post-mortem audits. SFC 2000 Report, supra
note 130, at 2.
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prosecution. 373 The SFC also recommended that Chong-Un and San Tong
be suspended on the firm level, that three accountants have their
registrations revoked, and that nineteen accountants be suspended.374
In the aftermath of the crisis, the KDIC has become the most vigorous
institution in holding corporate executives, accountants, and financial
institutions accountable. Since 2000, the KDIC's mandate required it to
reclaim public funds that were injected into financial institutions that
became defunct from those responsible. 375 The KDIC regulators pressed for
legal actions against executives that were involved with companies and
banks that collapsed during the crisis. In the process, the KDIC established
functional enforcement of the legal duties of directors, auditors,
accountants, and banks outside of the traditional corporate law enforcement
framework by holding parties accountable to someone other than the
controlling shareholders. 3 6 The KDIC's efforts contributed in establishing
both shareholder and stakeholder oriented enforcement. KDIC acted as a
shareholder in holding banking and financial executives liable to their
respective institutions. At the same time, the defrauded financial
institutions reinforced stakeholder orientated accountability for companies
by bringing legal actions against the corporate executives of their
borrowers. Unfortunately all of these actions occurred after the fact.
The KDIC's efforts involved a two-stage process. First, it compelled
457 financial institutions to bring a total of 1.5 trillion won ($1.25 billion)
in compensatory claims against 8,235 former executives and controlling
shareholders for their delinquent management and lending decisions of their
financial institutions.37 7 The claims added unprecedented legal compliance
373 The five companies were Daewoo Corp., Daewoo Motor, Daewoo Heavy Industries,
Daewoo Electronics, and Daewoo Telecom. In addition, nine Daewoo companies were
ordered to have specially-designated auditors and twenty-one executives and seven
accountants were referred to investigative agencies for further criminal probes. Id. at 4, 6.
114 SFC 2000 Report, supra note 130, at 6; External Audit Act, art. 16 (S. Korea);
Certified Public Accountant Act, art. 9 (S. Korea). Another thirty-six accountants received
lighter sanctions such as restrictions from auditing and warnings.
375 Daewoo Executives Cause W4.26 Tril. in Losses, KOREA TIMES, Sept. 25, 2002, at 8;
see Depositor Protection Act, art. 21-2, Law No. 5042 of 1995 (as amended Law No. 7027
of 2003; Law No. 6173 of 2000; Law No. 6323 of 2000) (S. Korea); Public Funds
Management Special Act, Law No. 6281 of 2000 (as amended Law No. 7111 of 2004) (S.
Korea).
376 To protect depositors and investors of banks, securities companies, insurers, and
merchant banks, the KDIC injected 107 trillion won ($89.2 billion) of public funds into
insolvent financial institutions during the crisis. PUBLIC FUNDS MANAGEMENT WHITE PAPER,
supra note 265, at 65.
377 Id. at 154; Commercial Code, Law No. 6545 of 2001, arts. 399, 401-2 (S. Korea).
KAMCO lost a High Court case that held that the Adonis Golf Club did not constitute
hidden assets of Woo Choong Kim. Act on the Efficient Disposal on Non-Performing
Assets of Financial Institutions and the Establishment of Korea Asset Management
Corporation [KAMCO Act], Law No. 5371 of 1997 (as amended Law No. 6737 of 2002) (S.
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to the financial industry, particularly in pushing lenders to improve their
own corporate governance and establish lending discipline. More
importantly, in the second stage, the KDIC pressed financial institutions to
bring claims directly against the companies that defrauded them in the first
place.378 Daewoo's executives and their accountants were among the first
targets.
The KDIC's special fact-finding team announced in September 2002
that Woo Choong Kim and forty-eight other executives and thirty-five
accountants caused 4.26 trillion won ($3.55 billion) in losses to the group's
five affiliates and their creditors. 379 The KDIC claimed Daewoo executives
manipulated accounting to defraud seventeen creditor banks of 3.81 trillion
won ($3.175 billion) between 1995 until 1999. It provisionally seized over
63.2 billion won ($52.7 million) of Kim's property and requested that
creditor banks bring civil actions against Daewoo's external auditors.38°
The KDIC even referred cases of personal enrichment for criminal
prosecution.38
Active monitoring by regulators and policy makers such as FSS,
KFTC and others could have saved incalculable damage while sparing
countless victims. The regulators failed to detect the seriousness of the
situation, monitor companies, executives, and accountants, and enforce
laws and regulations. The KDIC's efforts, however, represent a distinctive
ex post facto enforcement mechanism that has emerged. It successfully
operated outside of the legal framework associated with corporate
Korea); Sang-Hee Kim, A-don-ni-seu-gol-peu-jang, Kim- Woo-Choong-ssi bon-in-jae-san a-
ni-da [Adonis Golf Club Not Woo Choong Kim's Own Property], YONHAP NEWS, Feb. 8,
2005; Judgment of Feb. 8, 2005 (Seoul High Court) (unpublished).
378 In April 2005, however, the KDIC lost a decision to reclaim Kim's hidden assets
when the court determined that 220,000 shares rightfully belonged to his daughter and were
not his illegally concealed assets. I-Seok Oh, Kim Woo Choong Jeon-Daewoo Group hoe-
jang-i ddal-e-ge-jun isu-hwa-hak ju-sik-eun myeong-ui-sin-tak a-nin jeung-yeo-da [Isu
Chemical Stock that Former Daewoo Group Chairman Woo Choong Kim Gave to Daughter
Was Gift Not Nominal Trust], LAW TIMES, Apr. 13, 2005.
379 Jeong-U Hwang, Daewoo-bu-sil im-jik-won 49-myeong, hoe-gye-sa 35-myeong son-
bae-so [Daewoo Fraud, Liability Suits against 49 Executives and 35 Accountants], YONHAP
NEWS, Sept. 24, 2002.
380 Depositor Protection Act, art. 21-2 (S. Korea); see supra Part IV.A.
381 The KDIC referred over sixty-six former chaebol chiefs to criminal prosecution when
it discovered evidence of embezzlement or expropriation. The KDIC, for instance, alleged
that $44.3 million of the BFC funds were siphoned off to a Hong Kong paper company that
served as a front for Woo Choong Kim. These allegations were later confirmed in Kim's
criminal trial. Furthermore, the KDIC alleged that Kim made $2.5 million in donations to
Harvard University and 19 billion won ($15.8 million) to Ajou University through company
funds and without board approval. These controversial donations came to light when the
KDIC brought its civil actions on behalf of Daewoo creditors. Cheong-Mo Yoo, Daewoo
Founder Kim's Concealed Assets Worth W140, KOREA HERALD, Nov. 9, 2001, at 13; see
also Hwang, supra note 198.
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governance that traditionally revolves around remedies in corporate law and
securities law.
D. Prosecutors, Courts, and other Public Guardians
Prosecutors, courts, and other public guardians such as the media
remained passive in establishing an effective corporate governance
framework. A tacit policy of soft enforcement prevailed in the treatment of
white collar crime committed by corporate executives. Whether they were
directors, executives, or controlling shareholders, corporate defendants
faced criminal discipline or media scrutiny through prosecution,
punishment, or public shaming only when companies collapsed.
Furthermore, in the rare case of a conviction, Korean presidents have been
notoriously generous in granting clemency.3 82  This created a lax
compliance structure under which the failure to observe corporate
governance duties, laws, and regulations became inconsequential events.
Complacency toward legal discipline and public sanction for corporate
wrongdoing developed from a variety of reasons, such as a socio-cultural
legacy of leniency, emphasis on economic growth, lack of training, and
improper influence. A dramatic shift toward serious enforcement against
corporate defendants and their advisers took place after Daewoo executives
received actual prison terms and some of the largest monetary penalties in
history.
Overall, an unwritten custom existed that corporate defendants should
be granted leniency due to their roles in developing the economy.
Corporate executives of the largest companies received the most special
status and benefits from soft enforcement. 383 One theory propounds that
those of privileged standing, such as chaebol executives, were bestowed
preferential treatment as part of the Confucian tradition.3 84 Prosecutors and
courts also expressed exaggerated concerns that punishing corporate
defendants, especially from larger chaebols, would damage the reputation
of the company and in turn cause serious economic damage to the
country. 385 Chaebol chairmen in particular received the most generous
treatment compared to other corporate defendants. When being
investigated for serious crimes, for example, prosecutors would
accommodate requests to avoid media attention by questioning them in
special locations away from the public view, under the rationale that
382 Nam-bal-deo-neun jeong-ryag sa-myeon [Strategic Pardons are Abused],
HANKYOREH, Aug. 7, 1999, at 5.
383 Heon-Pyo Hong, Noe-mul-gong-yeo-joe [The Crime of Bribery], CHOSUN ILBO, June
21, 1995, at 2.
384 Chan Jin Kim, Korean Attitudes Towards Law, 10 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y 1, 6 (2000).
385 Hong, supra note 383, at 2; Editorial, Geom-chal-ui bul-gong-seong [The Unfairness
of Prosecutors], DONG-A ILBO, June 10, 1995, at 3.
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negative media coverage would harm the economy.386 Similarly, for many
years, prosecutors refrained from prosecuting the corporate bribe-givers and
instead focused their efforts on the bribe-takers.387
Courts acted similarly. Even when they found chaebol executives
guilty, they routinely commuted their sentences based upon "enormous
contributions to the economy. ' ,388 Actual imprisonment or civil liability
hardly occurred. Woo Choong Kim, for instance, was convicted several
times, yet he never served prison time until recently. In December 1994, a
lower court found him guilty for giving a 200 million won ($222,000) bribe
to a former electric company head in relation to an atomic power plant
contract. 389  On appeal, he was only sentenced to eight months of
imprisonment with a one-year suspended sentence.39° Similarly, in the
presidential slush fund trials, Kim and a dozen leading chaebol chairmen
were found guilty of contributing over 510 billion won ($638 million) in
bribes during the 1980s and early 1990s to two presidents.391 All of them
received suspended sentences due to their "contributions to the
economy.,
3 92
Korean presidents reconfirmed the environment of leniency in the
enforcement process. 393  The presidents routinely granted pardons to
convicted controlling shareholders and executives of large companies.394
386 Yeong-Chan Yoon, Mil-sil-gu-tae deu-reo-naen yul-gok-su-sa [Yulgok Investigation
Reveals Old Practice of Secret Rooms], DONG-A ILBO, July 19, 1993, at 2.
387 Hong, supra note 383, at 2.
388 Jong-Suk Lee, Jung-mong-gu hoe-jang hang-so-sim jip-haeng-u-ye pan-gyel [Mong-
ku Chung Receives Suspended Sentence], DONG-A ILBO, Sept. 7, 2007, at 14.
389 Seong-Bong Ha, An-Byeong-Hwa-ssi jing-yeok 3-nyeon-seon-go/jae-beol 3 hoe-jang-
eun jip-haeng-yu-ye [Ahn Byung Hwa Sentenced to Three Years/Three Chaebol Chiefs'
Sentences Suspended], HANKYOREH, Dec. 7, 1994, at 23; Judgment of Dec. 6, 1994 (Seoul
Dist. Court) (unpublished). The government official that received the bribe received a three-
year sentence in contrast. Yang-Jun Hwang and Jin-Hwang Jung, An-young-hwe 22-nyeon-
6-wol-hyung Beul-guem-40-uk [Young-Hwe Ahn Sentenced to 22 Years 6 Months, 4 Billion
Won in Penalty], HANKOOK ILBO, Dec. 28, 1994, at 31.
39 Chang-Keum Kim, 8-15 sa-myeon-bok-gwon nun-kkil-kkeu-neun eol-gul-deul
[Notable Faces in the August 15 Pardon and Reinstatement], HANKYOREH, Aug. 12, 1995, at
5 [hereinafter August 15 Pardon].
391 Kim paid 140 billion won ($155 million) in bribes for a lucrative submarine contract,
among other items. Kim & Kim, supra note 71, at 567-69.
392 Id.
393 For authority granting power to presidential pardons in Korea, see Amnesty Act, arts.
3, 5, 9, 10, Law No. 2 of 1948 (S. Korea); Republic of Korea Constitution, art. 79, Law No.
1 of 1948 (as amended Oct. 29, 1987).
394 In the final days of Dae Jung Kim's lame-duck presidency, for instance, eight
executives who received suspended sentences all obtained presidential pardons and special
reinstatements. Over a dozen other leading corporate executives who had been found guilty
for economic crimes after the financial crisis were also granted amnesty and reinstatements.
Myung-Jin Lee, IMF gwan-ryeon-gi-eop-in dae-pok-sa-myeon jo-chi [Mass Pardon of lMF-
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Before his most recent pardon in December 2007, Woo Choong Kim, for
example, received separate presidential pardons in 1995 and 1997 for two
previous convictions for bribery.395 Executive clemency could be viewed as
part of a legacy from Korean history under which kings were expected to
extend their benevolence upon those of privileged status.39 6 Since the
prosecutors' office is technically underneath the Ministry of Justice and part
of the executive branch, presidential clemency sent a message to law
enforcement on how corporate executives should be excused.
Several other factors contributed to soft enforcement. First, corporate
defendants could generally afford better legal representation, which might
explain why they fared better in court. Prosecutors and judges also received
limited training in sophisticated corporate abuses. They remained
inexperienced in financial and accounting affairs, because claims involving
accounting fraud, market manipulation, insider trading, and
misrepresentation seldom occurred. Moreover, prosecutors and courts from
civil law traditions felt constrained from jurisprudential activism to develop
new areas of the law and advocate newer theoretical developments in such
areas as the burden of proof and proving and calculating damages. Heavy
caseloads and time constraints further burdened the legal system.
Prosecutors rarely brought cases against corporate wrongdoing unless they
received a referral for criminal prosecution from regulatory authorities.
Regulatory authorities, in turn, rarely referred cases. Prosecutors thus at
times sought enforcement against corporate managers in an inconsistent
manner compared to other defendants.
Likewise, the media did not fulfill their roles as the public guardians
against corporate misbehavior.399 Investigative journalists rarely directed
their attention toward governance issues .400 Domestic media scrutiny
generally involved reporting events of wrongdoing after the fact. Critical
Related Businessmen], CHOSUN ILBO, Dec. 31, 2002, at A4.
395 Six other leading chaebol chairmen were also pardoned and reinstated together with
Kim in 1997. August 15 Pardon, supra note 390; Jeong-Guk Yoon & Gi-Dae Yang, Jae-
beol-chong-su deung 21-myeong gae-cheon-jeol sa-myeon-bok-gwon [Twenty-one Including
Chaebol Chiefs Pardoned and Reinstated on National Foundation Day], DONG-A ILBO,
Sept. 30, 1997, at 1. See also S.Korea [sic] Pardons Daewoo Founder, supra note 5.
396 Kim, supra note 384, at 5.
397 Seung Hwa Chang, The Role of Law In Economic Development And Adjustment
Process: The Case ofKorea, 34 INT'L LAW. 267, 273-74 (2000).
398 Kim & Kim, supra note 204, at 387.
399 For a general discussion of media's role in corporate governance, see generally
Alexander Dyck et al., The Corporate Governance Role of the Media: Evidence from Russia
(European Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 154/2007).
400 See Bernard Black et al., Corporate Governance in Korea at the Millennium:
Enhancing International Competitiveness, 26 J. CORp. L. 537, 552 (2001) ("[F]inancial press
reporting of corporate governance abuses has not been a significant influence on chaebol
behavior.").
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reports analyzing Daewoo's state of affairs that could have foreshadowed
its financial difficulties did not occur. Foreign media offered only
marginally more critical reportage of Daewoo.40' They too operated weakly
as public guardians in shedding light on its problems.
The weak state of the media as a gatekeeper stemmed from a mixture
of reasons. First, corporate interests, particularly the chaebols, wielded
considerable clout over critical reporting in Korea. The media remained
captive to the advertising revenue from the conglomerates to a significant
degree.4 °2 The media also faced threat of libel or defamation actions.40 3
Furthermore, in the case of newspapers, companies could exert pressure
through a controversial practice of publishing the "First Editions" of the
next morning's newspaper on the evening before. Under this practice,
companies reviewed the contents of the next morning's edition before it
was widely circulated.40 4  While this granted the companies a chance to
point out errors, in other cases they could influence the editorial content
toward their liking. Finally, several major newspapers are owned by
families with family ties to the controlling shareholders of leading
chaebols.4 °5 Newspaper owners reportedly have been known to influence
editorial views.
After the financial crisis, the overall environment of soft enforcement
and public scrutiny dramatically changed. Public uproar led to piercing of
the informal veil that had been shielding corporate executives. In
December 2001, the prosecutors' office formed a Public Fund Misconduct
401 See Clifford, supra note 31 (reporting on the current state of Daewoo's business in
1988); see also Perlez, supra note 36 (raising concern of how Daewoo, "a debt-laden
company," plans to finance its expansion into Central Europe).
402 See Andrew Ward, Newspapers in SK Corp Row, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2004, at 23
(reporting that a recent account involving the ability of chaebols to influence the press, "[i]f
true,... would show how South Korea's biggest business groups, known as chaebol, can
influence newspapers through their heavy advertising spending and family connections to
the country's press barons").
403 According to the Korean Press Arbitration Commission that handles most defamation
disputes, corporations brought a total of 1,358 defamation or other actions to the Committee
against the press between 1982 and 2004. KOREAN PRESS ARB. COMM'N, 2004 ANNUAL
REPORT OF ARBITRATION STATUS, available at http://www.pac.or.kr/html/data/dtstatus
_view.asp?seqid=2 1 &num=6&page=3&cur..pack=0&sfield=&s.string=&tbname=ptbl-pds
1 l&j=6.
404 On October 15, 2001, Joongang Ilbo became the first major newspaper in Korea to
cease this practice. Jong-Hyuk Lee, Ka-pan-geun-mu gatekeeping-yu-hyung-gwa I-ae dae-
han un-ron-hong-bo sil-mu-ja-dul-eui pyung-ga [Gatekeeping Types as Screening First
Edition Newspapers and PR Practitioners' Evaluations], 46-6 KOREAN J. JOURNALISM &
COMM. STUD. 191, 192 (2002).
405 Joongang Ilbo and Dong-A Ilbo, two of the Korea's leading newspapers, are examples
of newspapers with direct family relationship with chaebols. Hyuk-Chul Kwon, Jo-jung-




Joint Oversight Team consisting of representatives from the police, tax
authorities, customs authorities, KDIC, FSS, and Korea Asset Management
Corporation ("KAMCO"), with Daewoo being a major target.40 6
Prosecutors then sought unprecedented, harsh sentences against Daewoo
officials including Chairman Kim. The judiciary obliged and sentenced
Kim, despite his age and poor health, to eight and a half years in prison and
the former head of Daewoo Corp. and Daewoo Motor to five years, both
without any commutation.40 7 Courts pronounced astronomical monetary
penalties upon seven defendants. Matching the scale of the accounting
frauds, disgorgement penalties of joint and several liability ranging from
21.25 trillion won ($17.7 billion) to 23.03 trillion won ($19.2 billion) were
levied first against three junior directors and officers of Daewoo Corp. and
then Chairman Kim.40  Four senior executives received smaller
disgorgement penalties ranging between 1.47 trillion won ($1.75 billion)
and 3.71 trillion won ($4.16 billion).40 9 The disgorgement penalties were
the largest in Korean history, if not in the world.
4 1
The sentences and penalties sent a powerful message how executives
and chaebols would be held accountable. A consensus emerged to levy
actual prison sentences against senior executives of chaebols and to hold
them responsible for the damages they caused n. 1  Courts emphasized the
406 As a result, 181 persons from leading financial institutions, companies, and
accounting firms were detained and eighty three persons were arrested. The prosecutors'
office brought cases against dozens of Daewoo executives, including Chairman Kim and
their accountants. PUBLic FUNDS MANAGEMENT WHITE PAPER, supra note 265, at 149, 159.
407 Other Daewoo defendants, however, received judgments between eighteen months
and seven years that were suspended in terms of actual jail times. Several did not receive
suspended sentences in the lower courts. See, e.g., 2001 No 2063, at 5; 2002 Do 7262, at 4;
2001 Gohab 129, at 2. On appeal two of these defendants subsequently received suspended
sentences. 2001 Gohab 171, at 5. Suspended sentences are common for convicted white-
collar criminals in Japan as well. Milhaupt, supra note 228, at 191; see Ja-Hyun Lim, Gi-up-
chong-su bum-lie chu-boul 'som-bang-mang-i' [Punishment for Crimes of Corporate
Chairmen 'A Cotton Club'], LAW TIMES, Jun. 18, 2007, available at http://www.lawtimes.co
.kr/LawNews/News/News Contents.aspx?serial=29360.
408 See 2001 No 2063, supra note 139, at 6; 2002 Do 7262, supra note 4, at 3, 4 (the
Supreme Court reduced the penalty by 1.3 trillion won ($1 billion) for one of these
defendants); 2005 Gohab 588, at 2.
409 2001 No 2063, at 6; 2002 Do 7262, at 3, 4. The only anomalous aspect of the
sentences was that, other than Chairman Kim, the three defendants who received the harsher
penalties were relatively junior officials. Logically, the senior executives with more
supervisory authority should have borne more responsibility and been penalized accordingly.
410 For comparison, the highest fine ever levied against a company in Korea was 542
billion won ($451.7 million) against the Hanjin Group in October 1999 for tax evasion.
Cheong-Mo Yoo, Chaebol Stunned by Government's Hard Line on Reform, Hefty Tax Fines,
KOREA HERALD, Oct. 6, 1999, at 7.
411 The imprisonment of the chairmen of Kia, Hanbo, and more recently SK represent
cases in which actual prison sentences have been levied. Sang-Hee Kim, Gae-sok-deu-neun
jae-bol-chong-su-wa gum-chal-ui ak-yeun' [Bad Relations Between Chaebol Heads and
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impact of Daewoo's actions upon the economy, society, financial
institutions, investors, and guaranty companies.4 12 The lesson of Daewoo
was that "it clearly demonstrated the enormous damage to the country and
people caused by criminal acts such as continuous and systematic
accounting frauds and lending frauds. 4 13  Courts further asserted their
determination that "Korean society must be firmer and stricter against large
scale economic crimes committed b those that disregard corporate social
responsibility and corporate ethics."' 414
Various mitigating circumstances combined with a measure of
unfairness exist surrounding the severity of the punishments. Arguably,
every chaebol supported its undeserving affiliates and committed
accounting and loan frauds and foreign exchange violations leading up to
and during the financial crisis. Yet, Daewoo was singled out. Had it
successfully turned the company around, perhaps it would have been lauded
and all misdeeds would have been forgotten. Daewoo apologists suggest
that Daewoo defendants were the scapegoats for the financial crisis or the
victims of political intrigue.4 15 Furthermore, they argue, the defendants did
contribute to the country's economic growth and they did not appear to
have benefited financially from the crimes. Other than Kim, none of the
executives were prosecuted for embezzlement or expropriation.4 16 Finally,
the Daewoo executives arguably worked under a corporate culture that
demanded obedience to Kim who gave "authoritative orders," and
maintained "absolute influence over the careers of the defendants. 417
Notwithstanding these arguments, Daewoo executives were culpable
because they ultimately did participate in the frauds for their own personal
gain in disregard of their duties to the shareholders. They inflicted
''enormous damage upon the Korean people and the national economy" just
so that they would "not lose the chairman's favor and to maintain their
Prosecutors Continues], YONHAP NEWS, Jun. 14, 2005.
412 See generally 2001 Gohab 171, at 52-53; 2001 No 2063, at 78. The High Court
virtually restated the District Court's conclusions verbatim regarding the reasons for the
harsh sentences and the Supreme Court affirmed these judgments.
413 The court also dismissed the "it was a common practice" argument. 2001 Gohab 171,
at 53; 2001 No 2063, at 79.
414 See, e.g., 2001 Gohab 171, at 53; 2001 No 2063, at 79
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positions. 41 8 They failed to understand that they did benefit personally
because they maintained their privileged status as corporate executives at
one of the Korea's premier conglomerates with its monetary and
reputational benefits. 41 9 Courts thus rejected the defense that the executives
had to passively follow Kim's orders. 420 As professional managers, they
had "a responsibility to prevent autocracy by immoral conglomerate heads
and controlling shareholders and to protect minority shareholders and
general investors., 42' The executives abandoned their duty to enhance
corporate transparency and engage in business operations legally even if
this conflicted with Kim's aims. Instead, they "availed themselves to Woo
Choong Kim's irresponsible, over-leveraged management. 4 22 Their active
participation in the cover-up further undermined their claims that they acted
in good faith on behalf of the company.42 3
V. CONCLUSION
Daewoo's mismanagement and accounting malfeasance went
"unchallenged, because corporate governance simply did not exist. '424
While primary fault lies with Daewoo's controlling shareholder and
directors, other market participants, both domestic and foreign, share a
significant portion of the responsibility. Leading commercial banks,
investment banks, reputational intermediaries, gatekeepers, and public
sector guardians, all failed as monitors to detect serious accounting
problems and also tacitly permitted them to persist. The breakdown of
corporate governance through the failures of these interconnected market
players was never fully examined. Years later, comparable meltdowns were
repeated in the form of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat, rocking financial
pillars around the world. Unfortunately, Daewoo's warning signs were
dismissed as an aberration, limited to a distant country called Korea that
was a victim of the Asian financial contagion.
This forensic study of Daewoo's implosion describes the formation of
formal corporate governance in an emerging market through the prism of a
Korean chaebol. It also described how chaebols first operated under a
418 2001 Gohab 171, at 53; 2001 No 2063, at 79.
419 In the criminal case against an executive of Daewoo Telecom, one lower court did
consider the lack of direct personal profit as a mitigating circumstance for sentencing. See
2001 Gohab 129, at 15.
420 The High Court opinion recites virtually verbatim the conclusion of the District Court
while adding some additional findings of its own. 2001 Gohab 171, at 53; 2001 No 2063, at
79. The defendants did not raise these defenses on appeal to the Supreme Court.
421 2001 Gohab 171, at 53; 2001 No 2063, at 79-80.
422 2001 Gohab 171, at 53; 2001 No 2063, at 79-80.
423 2001 No 2063, at 78.
424 Lee, supra note 20, at 175.
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system where the state played the central role as the lead monitor, not
directors, shareholders, or regulatory institutions operating according to the
dictates of formal law. As the state's influence ebbed, however, legal
protections were not established to replace its oversight function.
Ownership dispersion exacerbated agency problems, leaving chaebols
further susceptible to abuses. The financial crisis exposed the
vulnerabilities of ineffective corporate governance, with Daewoo being the
most egregious case.
This study of Daewoo builds upon the comparative corporate
governance literature regarding the relationship between formal law and
enforcement discipline and trends toward convergence. The role of
enforcement in establishing compliance of corporate governance duties and
responsibilities was emphasized. Following Daewoo's collapse, the
controlling shareholder, corporate executives, and reputational
intermediaries have been held liable, both civilly and criminally, on an
unprecedented scale. Enforcement discipline has been spearheaded by such
institutions as the KDIC that exist outside of the normal confines of
corporate or securities laws. In practice, Korea is also converging from a
state-oriented model toward a more shareholder-oriented system with some
emphasis on accountability toward the stakeholders. Formal convergence
has emerged through legal and regulatory reforms that followed the
financial crisis.
The Daewoo case offers a variety of lessons for corporate governance
specialists in emerging markets. Only through a comprehensive internal
and external framework can companies shed the perception of opacity to
receive competitive valuations. Corporate scandals continue to erupt,
demonstrating that transparency and accountability must be vigilantly
pursued within such a framework. In particular, local laws, markets, and
institutions do not bear the sole responsibility, but international market
participants must also be properly enlisted into the process.
